Research On Management Features And Accounting Choice Behavior Optimization In Listed Companies

Corporate finance and accounting in capital market is a cross-subjects research field, vigorous and challenging. In this field, accounting choice behavior is an important theoretic and practical proposition. This paper focus on the main body of accounting choice behavior: the impact of management features on accounting choice behavior. This paper constructs a systematic frame of accounting choice behavior research, including factors such as corporate governance, external supervision, principles supply and so on, in order to explain the accounting choice behavior. Based on tests of the impact of management compensation, term and designation, this paper discusses the methods to improve the efficiency of accounting choice behavior by management level. Through comparison research and signaling of accounting choice, this paper searches for the optimization of accounting choice behavior, and explores a proper supervision mode for the capital market, and to provide valuable reference to the development of listed companies in new times. This paper develops the accounting choice behavior theory in behavior main body, interaction between choice behavior and compensation plan, motivation optimization and so on.Chapter 1 discusses the management as the main body of accounting choice by the evolvement of modern corporate theory, in order to explain the accounting choice behavior of management. With the development of corporate theory, the management role and function has been deepened. New classic economics believes, management is the optimal behaviorist, without any personal interests, the management intends to choose the accounting policies that maximize the corporate interests. Management corporate theory and behavior corporate theory believes that management is a behaviorist that targets on self satisfaction, and the management will use accounting policy choice to satisfy self motivations. Modern corporate theory believes each corporate internal factor gaming for its own utilities. The accounting choice of management is no longer a tool for objectively revealing economic essentials, but a tool for subjectively achieving self goals. The accounting choice theory in team production theory is a process to record the contribution of team members. This process affects organization efficiency by affecting the enthusiasm of team members. Agency theory reveals the psychological complexity of management as procurators. Management in contract theory is an equal property subject, it will choose accounting policies helpful to contracts fulfillment.With much more uncertainty and competition in modern corporate development, the rarity of management as human capital becomes more important to corporate development. Its negotiation power grows. Management is in charge of accounting choice, and it is more likely for them to search for path to realize their human capital, which leads to more complexity and uncertainty on accounting choice behavior of the management.Chapter 2 constructs a self-organized model of accounting choice behavior and explains that the process of accounting choice is the interaction of management, other relative parties and external competitive environmental force. Their fierce competition will lead to a cooperate situation. If management behavior is leading (order variable), and other relative parties is obeying (fast variable). The competition of fast and slow variables will change their locations, and other relative parties are made leading (order variable). The new cooperate situation is the most efficient moment, and the management will choose efficiency type accounting policy which reveals all relative party interests.The model construction and analysis give us an important hint, in order to make accounting policy choice to represent the will of related parties, it is important to strengthen the power of related parties and external competition environment. There are serious limitations of the corporate governance structure in our country, the powerlessness of related parties and incompleteness of external competition environment, and the management is powerful. In this competition, the leading management is order variable, and related parties are obeying. The whole system represent the management will, and opportunistic management feature.Chapter 3 analyzes categories of accounting choice behavior by management intentions: management subjectively hostility to accounting fraud and management subjectively purpose to accounting manipulation. This chapter collects the evidence of accounting behavior in listed companies, and analyzes the features and governance countermeasures for accounting behavior at all levels. Fraud behavior can only be found in financial statements because of it is obvious, it is a serious lack of corporate governance, and has nothing to do with accounting and auditing techniques. Its countermeasure is to consummate system level. Manipulation behavior is the management disobeying the accounting principles. However, some manipulation behavior is a disguised fraud behavior, and has serious results due to system level reasons.Chapter 4 studies the accounting earnings management. The earnings management behavior of management is shaded by the multiple accounting choices and wide implementation of compensation plans. The earnings management behavior is complicated. It happened without compensation plans, which implicates the uselessness of current motivation system. The management are keen to pursue controlling revenue other than compensation plan, which lead to worse results than earnings management inside compensation plans. Many relative party transactions in listed companies belong to this category. When compensation plans is positively related to accounting choice behaviors, following situations happens: the first type is an efficient behavior beneficial to all party interests; the second type is a neutral behavior which are self-beneficial without harm to other parties; the third type is a opportunistic behavior which are self-beneficial with harm to other parties. Based on the relativity of compensation plans and accounting choice behavior, we are more aware of the serious results followed by freeness of the new accounting principles and fair value. To judge whether a accounting choice belongs to manipulation, neutral or efficient type will provide supervisions theoretical and practical evidence, and helpful to scientific motivation designing.Chapter 5 brings forward hypothesis and draws conclusions based on historical data from listed companies. Due to the particularity of capital market, weakness of supervision and special shares structure of listed companies, the unbalance of corporate governance made the accounting choice behavior different from western capital market. The model test indicates that management term has no impact, independent directors rarely monitors, there is no independent force to prevent manipulation behavior; the controlling shareholders positively related to accounting manipulation behavior; 3 hypothesis from western companies: size, debt and compensation contract are invalidated; regroup times are invalidated, which explains the make up listing characteristic in China capital market.Chater 6 studies the motivation method of management accounting choice behavior. First, well corporate governance mechanism is needed to motivate the management for long term professional expectations. It is vital to find investors really care about corporate value other than separating shares. Second, a long term motivation plan based on management value creation is needed, otherwise the management will keen to pursue controlling revenue besides residual rights. Third, a well designed compensation plan will lead management pursue residual rights revenues based on compensation plans. However, management should have the freedom for accounting choice. If the government restricts this freedom, the optimization mechanism of accounting choice will lose its base. Last, outsiders such investors should recognize the positive accounting choice behavior of management and make the price compensation. If investors can not see through the things behind accounting numbers, adjust profit numbers by different accounting policy choices, ignore the impact and make price punishment afterwards, then the management will positively choose efficient accounting policy. The signaling of accounting choice will lead the stock price to its value, and lead a healthy capital market.According to the process above, there is still a long way to go for the capital market in our country, and it is a natural law.