An Study On Performance Preannouncement Of Chinese Listed Companies Based On The Ultimate Controller's Characteristics

Accounting information plays a leading role in capital market,especially in security valuation and information disclousure. To maintain fair information and promote information efficiency is the key to protect the investors'interest and to realize resources-compounding. So it can realise the demand of CSRC, which demands the stock market of china to be an open, fair and justice market. Earnings preannouncement practices the ideal of high quality information. As an information system, the earinings preannouncement demands the listed companies whose earnings will vary largely to disclose the information to the investors before periodic report, and it is helpful to them to make rationl decision. As a useful supplement to the periodic report, earnings preannouncement eliminates the asymmetry of information and information lag, improve the timeliness of information. It would help to suppress internal transactions and achieve a fair and efficient capital market. The rule is gradually revealed under the concern of more and more people. the earnings preannouncement belongs to the accounting information disclosure arena on the surface, actually it belongs to corporation governance arena. Because the preannouncements are disclosed by the companies' internal controllers, who are subject to actual controllers, and behind the actual controllers are ultimate controllers. To ontrol the listed company's information through agent-internal controller is one of the measures that ultimate controller control the listed companies. Specifically, accouting information is one of the important information in listed company, so the preannouncement characeristics are branded in the ultimate controller' to some extent.Researching the governance from the aspect of ultimate controller is an advanced arena. The current main international literatures related to the governance performance of audit committee mostly make use of the agency cost and governance analysis framework based on the traditional governance theory (paradigm). Study from the aspect that ultimate controller exproprate the minority sharesholder is rare. The concept of ultimate controller is showed first on a paper published by La Porta et al. (1999) which analyse the ownership structure in the world. For disclosing the strong stockholder' ownership characteristics, he tracked to the ultimate controller and its ultimate ownership which is the controller of the strong stockholder. Furthermore,he divided the ultimate ownership into controlling right(voting right) and cash flow right(real equity investment).After his paper, the new agent cost analysis framwork is inherited and progressed in the literatures which reaearch the eastern asia and european capital market. The concept is based on the breakthrough of the new governance framework without queston.The article studies the earnings preannouncement from the aspect of the ultimate controller. Ultimate controller characteristics will show by preannouncement phenomenon, so it is a new viewpiont to research the preannouncement by classifing the ultimate controller. According to ownership characteristics, we put the ultimate controller into government and non-government; according to control entity, we classify the ultimate controller into three kinds:state institution, state-owned corporation, non-govoernment entity. The papers I have searched rarely research from the ultimate controller aspect. The article has the following chapters:Chapter One: introductionThe chapter introduce the study motivation; concept of ultimate controller, real controller and strong sharesholder; concept of preannouncement and alike; study methold; main conclusion and innovation viewpoint; study limitation and the progressing orientation.Chapter Two: study on preannouncement system evolution.The chapter introduces the progress of preannouncement system domestic and foreign.Chapter Three: literature review.The chapter summarizes the literature about preannouncement domestic and foreign.Chapter Four: study on the relationgship between ultimate controller characteristics and agent cost.The chapter analysizes the relationgship between ultimate controller characteristics and agent cost deeply. Through the analysis we find the self-profit reason of the ultimate controller, it is different to the administrator governance cost.Chapter Five: ultimate controller characteristics and preannouncementThe chapter first explains that the preannouncement belongs to the arena of agent, then we study the ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement phenomenon. Based on the study, we develop the hypothesis.Chapter Six: empirical studyThe chapter combined by the following content1. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement type;2. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement accuracy;3. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement estatement;4. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement market effect.Chapter Seven: conclusion, suggestion and expectationThe empirical test supports mojority hypotheses. Also it discloses the existing deficiency. Now we only demand the listed company to disclose the real controller behind, but not ultimate controller. Therefore, it is necessary to draw the regulation to demand the listed company to disclose the ultimate controller for information symmetry. Second we should draw the preannouncement regulation by ultimate controller characteristics.At last we should punish the restatement and other phenomenon in the preannouncement strongly.