The Evolvement Logic Of The Institutional Change In The State-owned Band And The Dynamic Optimization Of National Utility Function

As the institutional change in the state-owned bank is one of the main propositions of China's economic development,the paper begins with the particularities of bank's property and the initial conditions of the institution,takes the nation as an endogenous variable,and finds the utility maximization problem of the nation is the major restricted condition of the institutional change in the state-owned bank.The paper recognizes and explains the rule of the institutional change with a broad horizon,and analyse the state-owned bank's status in quo and its revolution direction with the perspective of new institutional economics.Firstly,holding the hypothesis of rational man,the paper considers a variety of rational man,including central government,local government,and political banker, are impelled and constrained by the aim of utility maximization.Based on the analysis of the institutional changes of state-owned bank with dividing its development history into several stages,the paper point out the institutional changes of state-owned bank is progressive,hysteretic,and peremptory,and shows path dependence to the government intervention.The paper also considers the basic logic of the institutional change in state-owned bank determined by the proneness of utility maximization in different stages,and the trend of institutional change ultimately in state-owned bank is from being peremptory to introductory.In its part of empirical analysis,the paper separated the performance index of state-owned bank into the firm performance itself and the market performance of the whole macro economy.During the livelong institutional change,the state-owned bank comes through stages form a deviation to a consistency of the objects of firm performance and market performance.The central government is suffering the difficulty of intervention,which maintained leads to institutional risk,while being quitted creates an institutional gap.Having confirmed the logic of the nation's utility maximization as a restrict condition in the institutional change in state-owned bank, and with the North paradox of new institutional economics,the paper figures out the nation's utility function has a trend focusing on from rent income to tax income.For the government incline to protect the public ownership inherently,and the invested interest groups stick up for existing institution,as well as there exists a cost of property appraisal,China's institutional change in state-owned bank demonstrated its hysteretic,and the transition economy,the gist of which is the revolution of increment, is a sub-prime institutional arrangement to protect the interests of the government.Based on the analysis above,two core missions of the institutional change in state-owned bank are obtained:the one is to fix on the role and function of the government,the other is its direction of future development.And the role reversion of government is a key to the success of state-owned bank's transition determined by public ownership.The orientation of the institutional change in state-owned bank in the future is to divide the operation of state-owned commercial bank and policy banks apart completely.Then state-owned commercial bank will make its own market performance a target,according to the nation's utility function that tax income increases based on an effective property;while,much more investment of macro economic construction will be distributed to policy bank in order to realize the government's aim of social performance.The paper draws several conclusions in research as follows.The evolvement logic of institutional changes in state-owned bank is consisted by the realization of national utility maximization.The process of the institutional change in state-owned bank substantially is a game between endogenous and exogenous rules.The state-owned bank' institutional change is progressive,hysteretic,and peremptory,and shows path dependence to the government intervention.The institutional change in state-owned bank comes through two stages,form a deviation to a consistency of the objects of firm performance and market performance.During the change,the central government is suffering the difficulty of intervention,which when it is maintained leads to institutional risk,and creates an institutional gap as it is being quitted.The binary plan carried out by government is a sub-prime institutional arrangement to protect public ownership.The realization of government's utility function maximization is a dynamic optimization process from rent income to tax income.The success of state-owned bank's transition depended on the role reversion of government.