A Study Of Commons Contribution Level Based On Preference Heterogeneity

Commons is universal in human society. However, the characteristics of the commons that non-excluadability and non-rivalness determine two types of institutional arrangements (market and government) both can't solve the effective supply of commons in complex real life. Hence, it's particularly necessary to analyze the third institutional arrangements: voluntary supply of commons. And the most critical theoretical issues are the commons contribution mechanisms of heterogeneity. There are many cases of success or failure commons contribution, but we have not an effective theory to explain, and the viewpoints on heterogeneity effects are positive effect or negative effect or U-shaped relationship in existence at the same time. Then we present the academic problem on capturing and explaining individual heterogeneity seemingly contradictory and its impact on the level of commons contribution.Around these issues, the start port of this article is the microeconomic theoretical ideas based on the individual utility, and the perspective is the most important one-dimensional preference heterogeneity. Combined use of game theory and other analytical tools of modern economics, the main works are presented in four aspects below.Firstly, the individual selection was introduced into the "preference-utility" traditional economic theory, and then the identification and characterization of the heterogeneity complex mechanism were researched from the perspective of individual decision-making.Neo-classical methods are usually denied heterogeneity, and its theoretical model is often the main economic homogeneity or characterized by the representation of actors, individual selection and therefore meaningless. Based on the distinction differences of individual decision-making knowledge, we emphasize the importance of individual selection and define the essential one-dimensional preference heterogeneity.Secondly, the article systemically researched the preference heterogeneity mechanism of N-person game model under the general function form and different decision-making scenarios.Adopting the research method of preference parameters, we first discussed separately commons contribution level based on individual preferences heterogeneity under purely preferences and conditional preferences two cases, and received the general conclusions of the individual preferences heterogeneity mechanism: without taking account of the individual wealth endowment differences, the relationship between preferences heterogeneity and commons contribution level is negative; and that the relationship between conditional preferences differences and commons contribution level is difficult to determine. Then in order to address the conceptual conclusions, we conceived three analytical models which were a single period, over-period as well as reciprocal cooperation respectively in accordance with the possible changes of individual decision-making points, solved and obtained the definitive conclusions about the one-dimensional heterogeneity effects under different scenarios: if the commons contribution level or individual donations can't exceed the minimum limit of fixed costs, then the non-cooperation equilibrium has nothing to do with the inter-individual preferences differences; if exceeded, then both free-riding and some people assume contribution are possible, furthermore, there is a linear increasing function relationship between the non-cooperation commons contribution level of someone free-riding and the participators' preferences; if exceeded and achieved the cooperation equilibrium, then the smaller the individual preference heterogeneity, the larger the collective action gains, whereas the larger the individual preference heterogeneity, the more difficult the collective action happen.Thirdly, the article tried to give an alternative analytical idea about the heterogeneous "U-shaped" relationship at the basis of the above discussion.Arguing from the repugnance of statements about heterogeneity and commons cooperative contribution, we dealt with the heterogeneous U-shaped relationship. By adopting the logic partition of individual decision knowledge state and the analytic model of individual decision under different decision scenery, the research result shows that in the base case, the relationship between the single dimensional heterogeneity and the output level does correspond primarily with monotone, the "U-shaped" just a sort of special case. The repugnance of statements is multifarious results for the simple reason that different analytical purposes and different subjects investigated.Fourthly, residential commons as an empirical example was investigated.Selecting update maintenance problems about a class of typical residential commons (for instance, urban community residential elevators) as an inspection object of the empirical research, we set indicators, designed questionnaire and collected dates at the basis of the analytical models. Through inspection of the cross-section sample of the target state, we tested the research conclusions. This empirical work not only avoids the traditional limits that either theoretical and empirical phase out of touch or empirical research can only be based on descriptive analysis of cases because of lacking of a general realistic consistent theoretical basis, but also on the theoretical model derived in the article provides a very strong evidence.