Research On Endogeneity Of Chinese Trade Policy In The Anti-dumping Perspective

The western democracy representative nation's trade policy is the result of balancing beween the government,the different interest groups and the citizens.So the trade policy made by the government is not possibly maximizing social warefare.It is usually affected by some particular interest groups.It is endogenously determined.For China,in the past command economy,China's trade policy is only aimed to achieve public economy goals.But now China is in the stage of transforming period,the political and economical enviroment have changed greatly.How is its trade policy determination machanism changed? What's the differences between China's trade policy determination machanism and that in the western country? In China there is no political donation,so how the interest groups influence the trade policy determination? With China's entry into WTO,anti-dumping is more frequently implemented by China. As one of important part of trade policy,we would like to analyze the characteristics of China's trade policy in the perspective of anti-dumping,And try to answer the following questions:Is China's anti-dumping trade policy endogenously determined? Is it influenced by some specific interest groups? If the answer is yes,then in what way? What kind of factors affected China's anti-dumping trade policy?The dissertation is arranged for nine chapters.Chapter 1 is introduction, introducing the research background,purpose of the study,research methodology,the main content and innovation,as well as other explanations.Chapter 2 is literature review on the development of trade policy theory from exogeneity to endogeity.We devidied the existing theoretical research of trade policy into two parts:exogeneity trade policy and endogeity trade policy.At the same time the thesis point out that the emergence of endogeity trade policy theory does not mean that exogeneity trade policy theory is not fit for explaining the current economic phenomen.Chapter 3 analyse the endogeity of anti-dumping trade policy on the general level.The dissertation point out that there are two formation mechanisms of anti-dumping policy,one of which stem from the interest game of different participants in trade policy,another of which stem from the motive of social welfare.Even though in reality,government trade policies often take into account personal interests and public interests,the two natures of anti-dumping trade policy are difficult to distinguish completely.Chapter 4 evaluate the economic efficiency of anti-dumping trade policy.The efficiency of anti-dumping policies is analyzed separately under the large country model and the small country model,as well as in the conditions of multi- product markets and imperfect competition.Chapter 5,6 and 7 analyze the factors that influence the demand and supply of China's anti-dumping policy.Chapter 8 make an empirical test of China's data on anti -dumping cases in 1997-2006 to prove that China's anti-dumping policy is endogenously determined.But it's different from that in democracy representative system which is influenced by political donation,China's anti-dumping policy is formed by the government's specific attention to some specific interest groups.Chapter 9 summarize the whole thesis and draw some conclusions briefly.On the basis of this,points out the outline of future reseach.According to its research field and characteristics,the thesis integrates normative analysis with positive analysis,integrates theoretical analysis with empirical analysis.With a complete reseach and analysis,we draw the following conclusions:First,anti-dumping policy has two endogenous formation mechanism,one of which stems from the interest game of different participants in trade policy,another of which stems from the motive of social welfare.Under such circumstances,as an "Economic Man",the Government also maximize its own interests,the supply of anti-dumping policies is a response to domestic competitive interest groups' demand. Anti-dumping policy is the endogenous result of the balance bewteen the supply and demand from the policy winners and losers and the government's own preference.Second,from an economic efficiency point of view,the anti-dumping policy is "second best".The aim of government's supply of anti-dumping policy is not to improve economic efficiency,but for the purpose of income distribution effects.The role of anti-dumping policy(or of the degree of protection for domestic industries)depends on the degree of substitution between their products and foreign ones and the degree of competition in the domestic market.Third,the main demand of China's anti-dumping policy stem from the market competiton between the domestic the import-competing anti-dumping department and the foreign producers.Besides,the liquidity of input elements and the mobility of market transfer as well as the ability to express their interest will also have a significant impact on demand.The supply of China's anti-dumping policy is also different from that in the western countries.It does not depend on the political donation and professional lobbying.Instead,it depends on the Chinese government's attention to the welfare of some specific interest groups.Because of information asymmetry,the Government's supply of anti-dumping policy may be tracted by some information the domestic producers offered.Fourth,the enterprise differences in the specific industry affect the demand of China's anti-dumping policy.Only the difference among the enterprises is big enough, can it be possible for the large enterprises to lodge a anti-dumping application.At the same time,the government's limited rational judgements also affect the supply of China's anti-dumping policy.Compared to the existing literature,the thesis has several exploratory studies:First,using China's data on anti -dumping cases in 1997-2006,the thesis make an empirical test of China's anti -dumping policy and get some important conclusions.Second,based on the analysis,the thesis prove that China's anti-dumping policy is endogenously determined.But it's different from democracy representative system which is influenced by political donation.China's anti-dumping policy is formed by the government's specific attention to the welfare of some specific interest groups.Third,the government's anti-dumping trade policy is affected by its nonrationality. Restricted by information and the complex enviroment,the government can not make the optimal decision,so the government's anti-dumping trade policy decision is inevitably combined with something of non- rationality.