The Theoretical And Empirical Study On China Grain Subsidy Policy

At present, China has been at the stage of industrialization. The non-agricultural industries have already been in the leading in national economy. In general, China has the strength of industry supporting agriculture. Agriculture sector is becoming the subsidized object by government. As basic industry of agriculture, grain becomes the emphasis of government subsidy. Because the grain interest is lower, farmer income has become difficult. Severe international grain crisis made protection of national grain security particularly important. At this stage, national grain security and the promotion of farmer income have been the twin goals of China government subsidy. Since the original grain subsidy policy can no longer meet the present stage of economic development, Chinese government began the full implementation of direct subsidies to farmers from 2004. It has been continued to improve in recent years. In this context, the dissertation studied grain subsidy policy from theory and evidence. The main results were followed.The firstly, analyzed China's grain subsidy policy by the tools of economics. The paper explained the implementation basis of China grain subsidy policy from the weak industry support, the political balance game, the provision of public goods, interest group theory and multi-functional theory. On the basement, the paper analyzed the income effect, yield effect, restructuring effect and environmental effect of current grain subsidy policy by the tools of welfare economics and microeconomics.The secondly, evaluated the efficiency of china current grain subsidy policy by DEA model. From the view of system economics, the paper analyzed the theoretical basis of the efficiency evaluation of grain subsidy policy. Then by DEA model, the analysis was done from system efficiency, scale efficiency. At the same time, it analyzed the invalid reasons. The results were followed. (1) System efficiency provinces mostly concentrated in major grain-producing provinces and invalid provinces concentrated in rapid economic development provinces and poor provinces. (2) System efficiency provinces were mostly scale efficiency. It was known that the scale returns of Qinghai province etc were increasing. But returns of Beijing and Shanghai etc provinces were diminishing. (3) Invalid provinces were done by the slack variable. It was known that there was common contact between over-investment and lack-output. So improving the system efficiency need to begin from invalid reasons.The thirdly, empirically analyzed to the implementation results of china grain subsidy policy. The paper descriptively analyzed to the implementation effect by survey form of China grain subsidy policy. Then the quantitative analysis was carried out for the use of grain subsidy policy objectives by panel model. On the issue of shorter implementation years of current grain subsidy policy and less time-series data, the dissertation has empirically analyzed to the twin goals of grain security and farmer income. The result showed that the influence of grain subsidy variable was not significant for grain production, but was significant for the farmer income. At last, in the context of grain subsidy policy, the dissertation studied the synergy to grain security and peasant income.