Transition Of Listed Companies In China In The Economic Conditions Associated With Guarantees: The Financing Needs Or Interests To Grab?

Loan guarantee, as one of the Financing Institutional Arrangements, has been playing an increasingly important role in the development of China's market economy. Socio-economic role of loan guarantee mainly as follows: the promotion of financial intermediation and the circulation of commodities, the realization of security claims. However, due to the existence of the dominance shareholder, the main problem of the China's capital market is the major shareholder's embezzlement of Interest in various ways against small shareholders, which has also influenced the related-party loan guarantee behaviors of listed companies in China. This has led the dilemma view to the related-party loan guarantee.Based on the theory and empirical analysis, this thesis revises results of previous studies on the related-party loan guarantee in the following aspects: the related-party loan guarantee that listed companies provided to their subsidiaries is mainly due to the needs of financing while the related-party loan guarantee that listed companies provided to their controlling shareholder and shareholder's related-parties is the controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior. Further, we discuss the different motivations of listed companies that provide loan guarantee to their controlling shareholder and shareholder's related-parties according to their ownership. Finally, we firstly study the influence that the related-party loan guarantee may have on the relevance of accounting information.