Research On Regional Electricity Market Based On The Economic Development Level And Its Inter-provincial Differences

In some regions of China, there widely exist some disadvantages such as the low level of economic development, the imbalances and the different levels of the inter-provincial economic development. In the construction of regional electricity market, these problems would cause issues:the inter-provincial imbalance, inequitable distribution and the whole social welfare losses, which cannot mobilize the enthusiasm of the relevant provinces for participating into the regional electricity market and are unfavorable for inter-provincial and regional economic-social equality and coordinative development. Based on economic principles and the fundamental theory of the electricity market, this paper roundly analyzes the issues of the economic development level and the inter-provincial differences, it also establishes the regional electricity market mechanism based on the economic development level and the inter-provincial differences. Main results obtained as follows:(1) Evaluating the regional economic development levels and inter-provincial differences. Supposing the province as a node, this paper evaluates two aspects of power supply and demand:On the one hand, based on cost analysis, taking the unit cost of power generation as an index, it assesses the power cost and the differences between provinces. On the other hand, it evaluates respectively the price affordability and the inter-provincial differences of the industrial electricity consumers on the basis of "input-output" principle, "electricity costs-the cost of production" analysis and the residential ones using BP neural network technology.(2) Analyzing the issues of China's regional electricity market construction. Based on the status and existing problems of China's regional electricity market, this paper describes the ideas, basic principles, and the "road map", and puts forward some countermeasures, such as cultivating diverse market players, perfecting a sound legal system, transformating government functions and improving the technical support system.(3) Proposing a new adjustment mechanism in the regional electricity market. Based on welfare economics and the different power rent theory, this paper applies the "tax-subsidies" measures of "Pigou tax" program to adjust and amend the regional electricity market, sets samples of two modes of the generation-side competition and the wholesale one, and establishes the single-period bidding and electricity transaction models before and after the market regulation measures which can achieve the "inter-provincial" level playing field between market players, and solve the problem of market failure.(4) Proposing a new pricing mechanism in the regional electricity market. This paper makes the evaluated result of the economic development level and the inter-provincial differences as the impact factors and takes them into the price development and formation process:One is the internet price. After taxing in the generating units, it internalizes the taxes as the unit cost of power generation, and realizes the "inter-provincial" discount of the electricity cost; the other is the sales price. The grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) with subsidies need to fulfill the first obligation of sales price by based on the consumers'price affordability. Taking the province as a node, this paper establishes the sales price model based on electricity consumers'price affordability and its inter-provincial differences, which improves the grid corporations'(or the power supply enterprises') profits, the overall user's utility and the social welfare.(5) Proposing a new regulatory mechanism in the regional electricity market. When the electricity regulatory agency does the regular monitoring work in the electricity market, it also needs to apply the "Pigou tax" program to establish taxation and subsidy mechanisms of the regional electricity equal fund:imposes tax from generating units in the low-cost province, and provides subsidies to the grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) in low-price-affordable province, and the grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) need to fulfill the second obligation of implementation of the universal service after obtaining subsidies. Based on the mechanism design theory, combined the universal service characteristics of public goods and information asymmetry, taking the perspective of electricity regulatory agency into account, and considering the two constraints of individual rationality and incentive compatibility, this paper proposes an incentive-compatible mechanism of an electricity universal service which realizes the cost of compensation and economic incentives to the grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) and overcomes the problem of inadequate incentives of the pure cost compensation mechanism.