Study On Government Behavior In Local Public Goods Supply

Public goods can be divided into national public goods and local public goods, according to benefit from the geographical area. In reality, many public goods belong to local public goods. In 1998, a framework of China's public finance was established, in which clearly defined that local public goods should be supplied by the local government in order to service the residents more effectively. Because the Chinese present finance decentralization system has the unreasonable place, the local government spends too much to bear and can not effectively exercise its functions of supplying local public goods. Meanwhile, under the political centralized achievements inspection system, the local government possibly causes excessively many resources to economic growth because of one-sided pursue to invest to can bring directly in the official tenure in office the domain which GDP grows, and the role to supply local public goods is ignored frequently. At present time, some local governments have series of difficulties in policy execution because of lack of public goods, and it has become China's prominent difficult problems during China's economic and social development. Therefore, how to improve the capacity of local public services aim to the dilemma of local public goods' supplying is particularly important and urgent, and has highly theoretical and practical significance.In this dissertation, the transition of China's economic development has been taken as research background, and Public Economics, Game theory, Institutional Economics and so on has been utilized to research and analyze government's diversified behavior to public goods supply, and initially set up the research framework of government's behavior with the local public goods supply. At the micro level on the supply of local public goods, local government financing behavior, regulations and factors of affecting the efficiency of the Government to supply the local public goods have been made a thorough and meticulous analysis and research; At the macro level, the relations between the central government and local governments, which influence the supply of local public goods, have been analyzed. And based on this foundation, the Game model of the supply of local public goods between the governments has been constructed. In the empirical analysis, multi-aspect and multi-level have been carried on the inspection on the present situation of China's local public goods supplying. The institutional reasons of the low efficiency in local public goods have been analyzed. It probes how to improve the supply of local public goods efficiently in the situation of China, and consider what kind of government behavior needed to benefit the local public goods supply. The research has been carried on from major issues as follows:(1) as the main supply of public goods, China's local government's objective function and behavior restraint; (2) the influence on local public goods supply,according to the relations between China's central and local governments, and among local governments;(3) The government behavior in local public goods supply, and the institutional factors of government behavior;(4) analysis of the correlation between the level of local public goods supply and regional economic development; (5) explore the multiple ways of the local public goods supply and the local government's duty, in order to alleviate the contradictions of local public goods supply, and provide a theory basis for raising the public goods supplies efficiency for the Local government.The main structure of this dissertation is as follows:Chapter 1 is introduction. In this chapter, the research background, the theory value and the practical significance are elaborated, and the framework of research ideas, research content, research methodology and the main points of innovation are described.Chapter 2 are the summary of the related concepts and theory about the local public goods, and the breakthrough point which the discussion further studies. This chapter first reviews the theory of local public goods literature, and briefly reviews. Then through defining the related concepts of local public goods, including the benefit scope, characteristics of cram and the conditions of equilibrium, it clears that the local government is effective body of local public goods supplies, explores the theory of local public goods effective supply, mainly "club theory" and the Tiebout "voting by foot" theory. And two questions are answered:First, the best scale of local government to provide place for the best scale of public goods effectively; Second, the effectively way of local governments to provide local public goods.Chapter 3 analyzes the theory of government behavior in local public goods supply at the micro-level. It shows that to supply local public goods is the dominant position in local government's behavior and responsibilities, and thus the government's behavior becomes the main factors of affecting the supply of local public goods. This section at the micro level analysis on the government's supply of public goods in the financing, regulations and. conditions of affecting the efficiency of supply, and the government's behavior in local public supply in detail, and grasps the main factors impact of local public goods supply.Chapter 4 analyzes the theory of government behavior in local public goods supply at the macro-level. At the macro level,the impact of local public goods supply from the main factors comes from two aspects. First, the relationship between central and local governments, including the centralization and decentralization in the financial system, division of responsibilities between the Government and the division of powers, etc.; Second, the relationship among local governments, local governments have a dual competition, which will not only promote the supply of local public goods, but also hinder the supply of local public goods. Because the central government gets the dominant position in the property rights assignment in China, it will generally take the measures to be favorable to itself. And as an independent economic interest body, the local government usually takes strategy behavior to seek its local interest, which forms the game between the upper and lower governments. At the same time, because of the competition of political promotion among local government officials, there is a lot.of game among local governments. This chapter constructs the corresponding game models to analyze the series game relations between central and local governments, the relations among local governments in the local public goods supply.Chapter 5 is the.empirical research on China's present situation of local public goods supply. Through qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis of a combination of methods, it analyzes China's present situation of local public goods supply, difference and characteristics of regional, urban and rural distribution, as well as the government performance. Local consider the level of the supply of public goods depends on two variables, first, the institutional arrangements; second, economic capacity. On institutional arrangements, there is lagging in China's government transition at present, and it has not realized from the management of economy to social management reforming, corresponds with this, the finance was still the constructive finance, has not realized completely to public finance's reforming, to a certain extent has affected the public effective supply. Chapter 6 studies the relations between the changes in the government's behavior with the local public goods effective supply. This chapter first discusses the change of foreign local government's goal and behavior pattern under the influence of the theory of local governance, and sums up multiple experience and enlightenment. Which have certain reference to China's local government multi-way of the public goods supply.Chapter 7 is the conclusion, policy recommendations and further research direction. It makes a conclusion of the China's government's behavior in local public goods supply, the institutional factors involved in government behavior, the relations between the level of local public goods supply and regional economic development, the multi-way of local public goods supply and the government responsibilities, which have been discussed in above chapters. And it puts forward countermeasures and suggestions to regulate the government's behavior of local public goods supply, shows the inadequacies and direction for further research.On the base of research accomplishments already got, the main innovations of this dissertation are as follows:First. In the research angle of view, it studies the local public goods supply from the analysis of government behavior. It discusses the influence of institution arrangement between local governments and the environment characteristic which concerns the local public goods supply, analysis the institutional factors affecting the local public goods supply, seeks the government mechanism of local public goods supply.Second. It puts forward the necessary condition of local public goods effective supply is the local government behavior normalization. The Local government behavior may affect the flow of resources and the essential factor in the region.Third. It puts forward a new thinking way of local public goods supply. On the base of research accomplishments, it further proposed that China Local government should separate out the public goods production and the public goods service, according to the efficiency and the fair principle, dynamically chooses the best supplier. It is advantageous to local government in exploring the multi-way in local public goods supply, and it perfects the theory of public goods supply.