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Research On Application And Regulation Of Telecom Two-Sided Markets Based On Two-sided Markets Theory

Posted on:2010-10-14Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z H WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360308961781Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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The study for two-sided markets originated from western scholars' debate for a series of antitrust cases of bank card industry around the United States, Europe and Australia in the early 21st century. And later when scholars expanded the study to other industry markets and found some common characteristics among them, and a general theory of two-sided markets emerged. Two-sided markets theory studies such a market which is composed of a platform operator and two distinct groups of users with network externalities who interact or transact through the common platform,In China's telecom industry, due to saturation of traditional telecom business, all of three telecom operators have definitely put forward transformation strategy from traditional telecom operators to integrated information service providers. A lot of transformation business has distinct characteristics of two-sided markets,and we call these business markets as "telecom two-sided markets". Business transformation has also brought about some problems such as cross-subsidies, service package, exclusive dealing and service interworking across different networks, etc. which may be more obvious in the context of all-service operation and 3G. For these problems this paper attempts to study certain operational rules of two-sided markets, hoping to obtain some useful conclusions. The study for two-side markets began not so long in China. And literatures studying telecom two-sided markets with two-sided markets theory are still rare. Through the study of theory, this paper unveils some inherent rules behind some common phenomena in two-sided markets and expects to provide reference for the development and regulatory policy-making of telecom two-sided markets.This paper firstly summarizes literatures about pricing, platform ownership, etc. of two-sided markets at home and abroad recent years, and on this basis studies price subsidies, pricing modes and platform ownership issues of two-sided markets theoretically, then gives an applied research on telecom two-sided markets, and finally discusses several regulatory issues of telecom two-sided markets with two-sided market theory and research conclusions and policy recommendations are put forward.The main research contents and results are as follows:(1)To study platform operators' price subsidies for one side market. Constructs monopoly, closed and open duopoly models, analyzes the equilibriums before and after subsidies and finds that platform will subsidize one side market of low valuation type in order to reach economies of scale if two groups of users are sufficiently different in their mutual valuation of being matched at the formation and development stage of two-sided markets; however in a mature two-sided market subsidies will no longer be a platform operator's leading strategy, platform operators will devote much attention to improve mutual valuation between two groups of users. Thus, for a mature two-sided market, the policy implication is that the form of charging from both sides should be encouraged and bad consequences subsidies possibly bring about should be controlled.(3) To study three pricing modes of two-sided markets:subscription fee, transaction fee and two-part tariffs. The Nash equilibria based on the three pricing modes under monopoly and duopoly competition are derived. The results show that a monopoly platform has incentive to improve matching technology; duopoly platforms prefer to adopt differentiation strategy in competition; and subscription fee and transaction fee can be transformed into each other, regardless of subscription fee, transaction fee or two-part tariffs, a platform's profit has not changed, just the platform provides multiple choices for different demand of users. Therefore, regulatory authorities should not intervene in a platform operator's specific charging mode selection or perform ex post regulation.(4) To study platform ownership of two-sided markets. Two types of platform ownership structures:platforms owned by independent third parties and by suppliers are discussed. General two-sided models are developed to analyze the impact of different arrangements of the two types of ownership structures on three types of market structures:monopoly, duopoly with single-homing and multi-homing. And the conclusion is the socially optimal ownership is ownership by third parties.Therefore, regulatory authorities should support independent third parties to own platform ownership from the perspective of policy.(5) To have an applied research on telecom voice search markets-a telecom two-sided market. The paper analyzes competition modes of 118114 and 12580, China's two major telecom voice search platforms, and draws conclusions that brand effects and differentiation are key factors in competition of telecom voice search markets.(6) To analyze several widely concerned regulation issues including establishing an independent telecom regulatory body, market entry and exit, price and reducing users' transfer costs by combining China's telecom industry practice with research conclusions and relevant proposals are put forward.
Keywords/Search Tags:two-sided market, pricing, ownership, telecom, regulation
PDF Full Text Request
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