Study On The Innovative Supply Models And The Optimizing Financing Path Of Public Cultural Service Facilities

The famous intellectuals Lung yingtai ofTaiwan once said:“The opera ‘Shiro’iseffective than the efforts the mainland authorities have made to improve thecross-strait relations”.That is the power of culture.The Splendid Chinese culture is thenation’s roots, laying the Chinese people’s taste, upbringing and heritage. However,for a long time, Because of the GDP-oriented development ideas of Chinese authority,combined with rigid supply of public cultural elite, the supply of public culture cannot meet the cultural needs of the mass people, for whom the Problems of food andclothing is already solved. In this case,<the cultural reform and development planperiod> explicitly proposed to build "the system of public cultural services for thewhole society ", emphasizing the "fairness" and "efficiency of public cultural servicefacilities supply. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the present stage ofChina’s social, economic and cultural situation, October2011, the Party’s seventhsession of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee put forward a numberof major issues “to deepen cultural restructuring, promote development and prosperityof socialist culture”. On January2013, the party’s18report clearly states that "thedeepening reform of cultural system" to achieve "powerful country using culturalprosperity ",for this, the Ministry of Culture and the State Council has issued specificsupporting policies,which proposed purchase of public cultural services, community,social capital and cultural views and do policy advocacy in government-led, socialcapital through a variety of innovative models of participation in the provision ofpublic cultural facilities during September2013.Based on this background, on the base of summing up the three domestic supplymode of public cultural service facilities, this paper summarizes the supply model ofpublic cultural service facilities during the planned economy period, the transitionperiod and the new era, and we aslo analyzes the problem and its causes in the supplyof public cultural services facilities in the current. Secondly, to address these issues,based on the three levels competing game of government departments in charge ofcultural and social capital as well as the masses, we explores the cultural output ofpublic welfare and socio-cultural circumstances of the four tripartite cooperationmodel, and we try to find the model the output of which is the best by the comparison of the cultural, social and cultural welfare maximum. Again, for financing is the mostprominent problem of the supply of public cultural service facilities in the current.Considering the characteristic of public cultural facilities like:investment lingering,multi-stage financing and fuzzy fragile cultural output, this paper constructs a castendogenous financing decisions interactive dynamic marginal financing model, andfind six risk factors of public cultural facilities to isolate the impact of investment andfinancing, in estimating the value of public cultural facilities, to explore the path ofdynamic marginal financing decisions. Meawhile, this paper establishes a mixedproportional hazard model to analyze the impact of these six factors on the investmentrisk of public cultural facilities, on the basis of these analys, this paper pursuant toresolve the continuous interaction between the public cultural facilities lingeringeffects of investment, margin financing and the relationship between risk factors ofinvestment and financing risk management, to improve utilization efficiency of thecapital. Meanwhile, this paper use a panel data of financing of205public culturalfacilities samples between2009-2011, and use a "progressive" logistic regressionapproach to analysis and verify the theoretical results. Finally, on the basis ofimplementation theory, the paper discusses the incomplete financing contract ofpublic cultural services facilities to optimize the path financing contract arrangements,in order to achieve the theoretical by Rubinstein contract non-cooperative bargaininggame (non-cooperative bargaining game). And the government culture authorities,banks and cooperative relations between social capital can be optimized to achieve thethree co-Pareto optimal by this analysis.This study showed that: Firstly,“social capital to participate in government-led”under the “Arms’Length Principle” has certain scientific and applicability. On the onehand, only the government department in charge of cultural and social capital canachieve the optimal level of cooperation mode output, and the dispersion effect ofpublic culture is to play to the maximum. On the other hand, by comparing thefindings and several other public cultural service facilities supply model, this supplymode of public cultural service facilities can reduce the local government’s financialburden,revitalize public cultural assets, and can also prevent the erosionof culturalproperty by the social commercial capital. Secondly, the dynamic model of themarginal financing investment interacting with financing decisions of public culturalfacilities shows that, the financing threshold social capital is lower than the bank loanfinancing threshold. Moreover, both the size and distance threshold arrival rate of bank loans, price negotiation ability of investors, options growth potential of publicculture, the impact of cash flow volatility, the possibility of fund settlement risk, therisk of these six government financing factors, in particular the impact on the role ofpublic cultural growth potential options, the more and more opportunities forinvestment, the higher the arrival rate bank loan, the lower the fixed rate cash flowshock, public cultural facilities should be financed through bank loans, and reduceinvestment risk, investment timing advance; on the contrary, by absorbing the socialcapital financing and investment risk increases, investment timing should be pushedback. Finally, this paper introduces “punishing mechanism” in the financingcontract of public cultural service facilities, which can induce the two sides reached inthe absence of costs incurred in the case of (honest declaration, honest declaration)separating equilibrium; and this paper introduces “display mechanism”and useRubinstein bargaining with non-cooperative game (non-cooperative bargaining game)to fufill a non-cooperative bargaining game, as the basis for the design of incentives,and to induce the parties to Pareto optimality.