Selectivity Governance: Model Of Township Governance After Tax Reform

At the executive meeting of the State Council on July 16th 2014, Premier Li Keqiang pointed out, there are lots of links and slow progress for part of the policy implementation, heavy arrangement and light implementation, buck passing phenomenon exists for some localities and departments currently; some cadres lack of the sense of responsibility, and hide away encountering difficulties, not as, do not play, lazy political lax, and some engage in selective implementation and symbolic execution. We wondered, these acts are a universal behavior or an individual phenomenon in the grass-roots governance practice? Why is there such selective implementation and symbolic execution? There are many possible reasons. Grassroots leading cadres do nothing and not to play, or because of the insufficient financial capacity of grass-roots government. It is the problem of national policy and government system or the interest orientation. It is the lack of people participation, participation system is not smooth, or because rural relations have changed. Maybe it is the result of these various reasons. With these questions, the thesis studies on rural governance and gets a series of conclusions.Therefore, the thesis based on the investigation of Shandong qiao town as the research object, mainly studied the township cadres and normal township in the guidance of the localization of Chinese rural research. On the basis of the theme, the thesis consists of five aspects. First, the thesis studies the narrative system of township government functions and administrative calendar, as well as the choice of the township government for these tasks (chapter2); Second, the thesis studies fiscal foundation of the township governance, and then concludes the township government has profit, draw and selective characteristics (Chapter3); Third, the thesis studies the social foundation of the township governance, mainly explores the relationship between towns, villages and farmers (Chapter4); Fourth, the thesis studies the personnel foundation of the township governance, mainly explores the motivation and promotion game of the township cadres (Chapter5); Fifth, the thesis studies the running mechanism of township governance, mainly explores the mobilization ability of township government (Chapter6).On the basis of the above research, the author draws the following conclusions:First, selective governance has become a common mode of village governance. Second, selective governance is a "neutral" governance model. Third, selective governance is a process of the pursuit of maximizing the performance of township government. Fourth, "the selection control" is the basic characteristic of the township government.The author thinks, selective governance is that in the actual operation of rural governance, the township government and cadres as a rational actor, not fully comply with the policy requirements, but also not fully in accordance with the needs of the people, they have selective governance based on their own interests and demands, and in the comprehensive consideration of system space, financial resources, rural relations, personnel promotion and mobilization ability. Selective governance shows a great initiative of the main body and efforts to achieve the maximization of their own interests in a certain institutional context.Selective governance is not only a kind of highlights for the township government to its own reason and interests, but also a kind of response to the unity and integrity of national policy, and a fit for the system of performance evaluation. Selective governance behavior caused negative effects such as idle system, policy distortions, contradictions intensification and willingness to ignore, which brings about many problems for grass-roots governance. On the other hand, Selective governance behavior brought the beneficial effects such as system innovation, policy implementation and policy correction, and achieves the grass-roots governance to a certain extent.