Research On The Validity Of Institutional Change Of Chinese Securities Issuing Regulations And The Selection Of Institution

As the basic institution and the first indoor of securities market, securities issuing supervision and management is very important. Developed markets and emerging markets both established relative complete institution of securities issuing supervision and management to regulate securities issuing and protect investor’s interests. We analyze the role of Chinese securities issuing supervision and management institution and the problem, then intent to provide helpful suggestions to accelerate the development of securities market in future.The dissertation summarizes the history of institutional change of Chinese securities issuing supervision and management, conducts empirical studies on the validity of institutional change of IPO and secondary equity offering (SEO) regulation. We establish a game model with four players: an issuer, an investor, an intermediary agency and a supervisor. In our game model we analyze issuer’s optimal disclosure strategy and supervisor’s optimal punishment level, and study the factors that affect issuer’s information cheating level. We analyze the difference between issuing registration system and examination and verification system through information cheating level and social welfare loss, then discuss their applicability environment and institutional change. At last we discuss the selection of institution.The primary innovations and work of this thesis are summarized in the following:1. We build a game model through their gain to analyze their equilibrium strategy. We discuss factors that affect information cheating level and punishment level, including investor’s maturity, the degree of completeness of the law, supervisor’s regulation level, and the degree protecting investor’s profit. Then we study how to reduce information cheating level of securities issuing so as to promote truthful disclosure.2. We build a model to evaluate the validity of institutional change of securities issuing supervision and management through operation achievement, information cheating level and securities market achievement. The results show that institutional change can’t always reach its expected goal, and we should emphasize research on the validity of institutional change of policy with completing IPO regulation system.3. We analyze the validity of institutional change of SEO thoroughly, including right offerings and SEOs policy. Although right offerings and SEOs policy has changed many times, issuer’s information cheating level doesn’t descend obviously, operation achievement still worsens after SEO. The validity of institutional change is not obviously effective. Institutional change of SEO is accepted by the investors.The long-term market is negative to SEO’s policy.4. A game model is constructed to evaluate these two types regulation systems and we make further theoretical deduction and empirical tests. We analyze issuer’s and supervisor’s optimal strategy of two type issuing regulation systems. We discuss the difference of the two types of issuing regulation systems through information cheating level and social welfare loss, and their optimal applicability environment and the condition of institutional change.