A Study On The Right Of Residual Control In Accounting、Accounting Information Quality And Capital Allocation Efficiency

In recent years, the pace of convergence of corporate accounting standards and international accounting standards is being accelerated, the study found, international convergence of standards lead to elastic space of corporate accounting standards in China gradually increase, and the increase of residual rights of control in accounting, it also makes a negative impact on accounting information quality and efficiency of capital allocation of listed companies in China. How to make accounting standards policies can meet the complex economic business and international demand, while not to make excessive negative influences of a high degree of ownership concentration, low equity balance degree of listed companies accounting information quality and capital allocation efficiency, is a problem to be solved. This is not only a realistic choice, and a yet to be theoretical research and give a clear answer to the problem.On the basis of overview of relevant research results at home and abroad, the study uses some economic theories, such as incomplete contract theory, principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, stakeholder theory and so on, and normative analysis and empirical analysis of a combination of research methods, consolidated our market environment and institutional context, accounting residual control right to conduct a comprehensive, in-depth research. In this paper, to sort out the basis of the quality of accounting information at home and abroad, the efficiency of capital allocation Research and latest developments, based on the shareholding structure of our country to explore the accounting residual control rights, the relationship between the quality of accounting information and the efficiency of capital allocation, inspection and accounting The remaining control over the quality of accounting information and the efficiency of capital allocation.2007-2012A-share listed companies as research samples, this study empirical research on the relationship between China’s listed companies accounting residual control rights and the quality of accounting information using multiple regression method. The study found that The remaining accounting control over the quality of accounting information of listed companies in China had a significant negative impact, the greater the residual rights of control of the accounting, the worse the quality of accounting information. Consider different corporate governance factors, we found that, the largest shareholder control to some extent exacerbated the negative impact of the remaining accounting control over the quality of accounting information, the more intense the largest shareholder control, and this negative impact is also more intense. Equity accounting checks and balances to some extent inhibited the remaining control over the negative impact on the quality of accounting information.This thesis empirically studied relationship between the the accounting residual control rights and the efficiency of capital allocation. The results show that the the accounting residual control rights and the efficiency of capital allocation negative correlation, the greater the residual rights of control in accounting, capital allocation efficiency is lower, the higher the degree of over-investment and under-investment. Contract incentives and the efficiency of capital allocation efficiency are related, the higher the incentive effects of contract, the higher the efficiency of capital allocation.This thesis empirically studied the relationship between the quality of accounting information and the efficiency of capital allocation and accounting residual rights of control of the relationship between the quality of accounting information and the efficiency of capital allocation. The results show, is related to the quality of accounting information and the efficiency of capital allocation, the higher the quality of accounting information, the higher the efficiency of capital allocation, the lower the degree of over-investment and under-investment. Accounting surplus greater control over the quality of accounting information governance overinvestment effect is weaker, the smaller the residual rights of control and accounting, insufficient investment in the quality of accounting information governance, the stronger the effect.This thesis broadens the theoretical study of the domestic and foreign scholars on the remaining accounting control over, and provides a theoretical and empirical basis of policy formulation on the convergence of accounting standards. General accounting residual control rights increase has had a negative impact to the listed company’s accounting information quality and capital allocation efficiency. Research impact and economic consequences for the understanding of accounting standards convergence has important theoretical and practical significance lies in its Policy Implications:accounting residual rights of control caused by the convergence of accounting standards in order to limit the increase to improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies, regulatory authorities need to fundamentally improve the environment of the governance of listed companies, to limit the control of the largest shareholder, to increase the equity of checks and balances to protect the interests of small investors from abuse. In order to improve the company’s capital allocation efficiency, protect the orderly and efficient development of the economy, companies can improve the efficiency of contract incentives to constrain the behavior of internal investment, limit excessive investment and insufficient investment behavior to improve the efficiency of capital allocation of the Company.