Research On The Problem Of China’s Land Finance From Perspective Of Fiscal Decentralization

Enter the21st century, China has put forward the separation of ownership and use right in land use regimes, local government transfer a certain period of use rights to land users in the case of land ownership belongs to the state. The local governments increasingly dependent on land-related revenues to promote urban development and drive to local taxes increase. Land finance not only effectively compensates for the local government’s fiscal gap, but also create a lot of new challenges. A large number of agricultural lands have converted into urban construction land. While the rapid economic development, we need to be vigilant against the growing population and dwindling arable land. It is worth exploring when rapid expansion of urban area, what is the driving force of economic growth and motivation of local government.Firstly, this paper studies the connotation of land finance and divides it into three categories. The smallest proportion in the estimated size of land finance revenues is land-related tax and relatively stable. The state-owned land use right transfer revenues are subject to volatile by real estate industry macro-control policies. The largest proportion in land finance revenues is mortgage loan of land-use right of local governmental investment and financing platform, but also presence potential financial risks.Secondly, this paper systematically analyzes the cause problems by land finance. Base on the life cycle hypothesis and overlapping generation model with macroeconomics data from2000to2010, and used stepwise estimation method conduct empirical research on the relationship between land rent and housing price. Due to strong demand, local governments neglect basic housing requirements of low income groups, to get more capital, local governments begin to chase real estate profits and revenue of land transfer rise too, inadequate investment in affordable housing is main reason for land finance lead to housing price rise. Base on the VAR model prove that local government’s land supply have a significantly affect on land rent, not vice versa. The analysis of mixed-strategy game show that the central government increases the punishment can reduce probability of irregular land use. But principal-agent relationship of land use between central and local governments shows that besides output level(GDP)other indicators should be observed when central government devise supervision mode. Using econometric analysis of1999to2009period and31provincial panel data to urban cost-benefit model, and further verify the existence of uncoordinated development in city area and population increase.Thirdly, research on the behavior of government’s land finance from the finance, land system and soft budget constraint perspective, established theoretical model of local governmental land finance, and conduct empirical research by using panel data from1999to2009and DEA approach to measure the urban TFP growth.Finally, according to the study of the previous chapters and experience in developed countries and regions, this dissertation suggest that break the dependence of the local government land finance should start from multiple aspects.