Cooperation And Competition Mechanisms For E-commerce Platforms Under Two Typical Operation Modes Cooperation And Competition Mechanisms For E-commerce Platforms Under Two Typical Operation Modes

With the rapid development of information technology promotes the vigorous development of the e-commerce industry.Recently,the e-commerce is not confined to the traditional commodity trading,a growing number of traditional companies carry out the "Internet+" action to enter into the e-commerce market.With emergence and impetus of the typical e-commerce platforms such as Taobao,Jingdong and Ctrip,the e-commerce market in Chain has entered the era of ?one trillion.The operation modes of the realistic e-commerce platforms are broadly divided into four types,that is Marketplace,Reseller,Hybrid and Self-support.Along with the market competition intensifies,the margins of the e-commerce platform are narrow increasingly.Therefore,how to establish the win-win cooperation or competition mechanism with merchants becomes the important issues of mutual concern of the e-commerce platforms under different operation modes.Compared to the traditional retail model,the operation modes of the e-commerce platforms have two typical characteristics.One is that the merchants' quantity is greater and the heterogeneity degree is higher.The other is that the platform's functionality is stronger,that means the platform can advance the overall efficiency of the platform service system through providing the value-added services to the merchants or customers.The interaction process of the three participants(the e-commerce platform,the merchants and the customers)exists obvious differences in the platform service system under the different operation modes.Hence,we focus on the cooperation and competition mechanism between the e-commerce platform and the merchants under two typical operation modes(Marketplace or Reseller)considering the merchants' heterogeneity and the platform's functionality.Innovations and contributions of this thesis are briefly summarized as follows:(1)By the typical marketplace operation mode platform such as Taobao and Qunar in reality as the research object,we study the cooperation mechanism design problem between the e-commerce platform and different types of merchants from the charge and the product performance requirements considering the enterprises merchants and the individual merchants existing in the market at the same time.The findings show that cooperating with two types merchants and charging from the enterprises merchant is absolutely beneficial when the platform attractiveness for the enterprises merchant is high enough.(2)By the marketplace operation mode platform as the research object,we study the cooperation mechanism design problem between the e-commerce platform and different types of merchants from the charge and the value-added services considering the two types enterprises merchants existing demand competition(ie.,the demand of the different types of the merchants will be converted).The findings show that the optimal charge(the investment of the value-added service)is the quasi concave function(non-monotonic function)of the product price of the merchants with high product performance.When the competition of the two types of merchants is fierce,the platform should provide value-added service to the merchants with high product performance to gain more profit.(3)By the typical reseller operation mode platform such as Jingdong and Ctrip in reality as the research object,we study the cooperation and competition mechanism design problem when the e-commerce platform and the merchant exist coopetition.We consider how do the e-commerce platform and the merchant decision when the e-commerce platform and the merchant sell alternative products and the e-commerce platform provides marketing channel to the merchants for increasing the potential demand,the merchant sells its products and sells them to the platformat the same time.The observations show the menu of two-part tariffs that consist of a fixed fee and a per-volume fee,and the merchant's optimal price discount providing for the platform is non-decreasing in demand competition intensity.