The Corporate Governance Effect Of Mixed Ownership

The third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the party made the major policy to develop the implementation and adjustment of the state-owned enterprises,which began a new chapter in the reform of state-owned enterprises.The basic issue of the stated enterprises' reform is changing the presense of dominated one large single shareholder,which means the alliance of State-owned capital and non-state-owned capital promotes the mutual penetration and integration of individual and private economy and public ownership economy,while single public ownership system has been replaced by the diversification property rights system of mixed ownership.In 1990s,the government began to allow private capital and foreign capital to participate in the reform of state-owned enterprises,and positively developed the mixed ownership enterprises.In addition,the party in the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee clearly put forward the positive development of mixed ownership economy,implement of the mixed ownership reform as well as the construction of modern enterprise system.While aiming at making the decisions be right,the corporate governance structure is not only the most important organizational composition,but also represents the check and balance relationship between the enterprise and all the stakeholders.So,for state-owned enterprises,what has the governance effect of the implementation of mixed ownership?What kind of impact will the important stakeholders have?What is the difference between degree of mixing and the intensity of the different types of ownership and business?These are important issues that need to be answered theoretically and practically.Therefore,with the reform background of state-owned enterprises,taking the non-financial state-owned listed companies of 2010-2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share as samples and combing the normative research,empirical research as well as the comparative research method,this paper made the theory and empirical test about the corporation governance effect of mixed ownership of state-owned listed companies based on the theory of the stakeholders.Specifically,due to the mixed ownership including state-owned shares,shares of the collective,private shares and foreign shares,so the measurement of mixed ownership includes two parts:the diversification of the number of categories of shareholders and the diversification of the nature of shareholders holding and investigate the effects of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises on the agency costs between shareholders and management,the agency costs between major shareholders and small shareholders,redundant employees,and debt financing.And then further study the different influence of different scene of enterprise characteristics and controlling shareholder's shareholding.The chapter construction is as followed:The first chapter is the introduction part.The chapter firstly described the current research background and significance,and then expounded the research content,methods,framework and path of this paper.Finally,described the main innovation points.The second chapter is the literature review part.This chapter reviewed the related literature both of the mixed ownership and enterprise governance,and also found the breakthrough based on the shortcomings of the present research.The third chapter is the part of system background,theoretical basis and research hypothesis.This chapter stated the system background and the theoretical base firstly,and the proposed the research hypothesis.The forth chapter is the regression analysis of the effect of mixed ownership on Corporate Governance.This chapter is the key one.It mainly included the effect of mixed ownership on agency costs of shareholders and management,the agency costs of major shareholders and small shareholders,the redundant employees,and the debt financing and then further study the different influence of different scene of enterprise characteristics and controlling shareholder's shareholding.The fifth chapter is the main conclusion of this paper.Based on the four chapters before,this chapter summed up the conclusions and also proposed the future research prospects based on the limitations.The main conclusions include that:(1)The mixed ownership has a good governance effect,which can be reflected from the degree and categories these two aspects.On one hand,for the degree of mixed ownership,the results show that the higher the degree of mixed ownership,the lower the cost of agency costs,the less redundant employees and lower corporation debt financing capacity;on the other hand,for the categories of mixed ownership,the results show that:collective shares can increase the agency costs,but reduce redundant employees and debt financing capacity;private shares can inhibit the agency costs,but reduce the redundant employees and debt financing capacity;foreign shares can restrain the agency costs,but reduce the redundant employees and debt financing capacity.(2)The nature of enterprises is one key moderator for the governance effect of mixed ownership.Compared with the local state-owned enterprises,in the central state-owned enterprises,the stronger the negative relationship between mixed ownership and agency costs,redundant employees and debt financing,the stronger the negative relationship between collective shares,private shares and foreign shares the negative and the agency cost,redundant employees and debt financing;(3)The proportion of the controlling shareholder stake is another key moderator for the governance effect of mixed ownership.Compared with the controlling shareholder of the proportion of below 1/3 and more than 1/2,in the 1/3?1/2 of controlling shareholder stake,the stronger the negative relationship between mixed ownership and agency costs,redundant employees and debt financing;The stronger the positive relationship between collective shares and agency costs of shareholders and management,the stronger the negative relationship between collective shares and agency costs among shareholders,redundant employees and debt financing;The stronger the negative relationship between private shares and foreign shares and agency costs of shareholders and management and debt financing.In controlling shareholder of the proportion of below 1/3,the stronger the negative relationship between private shares and agency costs among shareholders,the stronger the negative relationship between foreign shares and debt financing.The possible contributions of this paper are:(1)The perspective is innovative.Based on the theory of stakeholder analysis perspective,this paper systematically examines the possible effects of mixed ownership of vital interests of stakeholders(including shareholders,managers,employees and creditors),the perspective of the research is a new.(2)Systematically discussed the governance effect of mixed ownership based on the empirical research method.This paper systematically studied all the corporate governance effect of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,which in a certain extent expand the existing research on the mixed.(3)Bring forth new ideas for the measurement method of the mixed ownership.The paper divides shareholders into state-owned capital,private capital,collective capital and foreign capital,while using the diversification of number of shareholders(Herfindahl index)and the diversification of the nature of shareholders holding shares(entropy method)measurement method for mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises at the same time,which provides more attuned to the connotation of the concept of measurement method.(4)Find the moderating effect of the nature of enterprises(central state owned enterprises VS local state owned enterprises)and the proportion of the controlling shareholder stake(below 1/3,between 1/3 and 1/2,above 1/2)for the governance effect of mixed ownership.