Research Of State-owned Capital Gains Based On Ownership Structure Stability

State-owned enterprises belong to people who are entitled to share the state-owned capital gains.The major problem in ownership structure of state-owned enterprises is that the state-owned ownership is overstable and the state stockholder has more likely abused power in the aspect of controlling ownership while plays a weak role in the aspect of gains ownership.At present,the reform of state-owned enterprises mixed ownership system in China is in a critical stage,the improvement in ownership structure,allocative efficiency of capital,dividend policy and state-owned capital gains management by means of mixed ownership system plays an important role in realizing the target of value preservation and increment in state-owned capital and of improvement in state economic competency.This paper mainly studies the ownership structure of state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital gains influenced by ownership structure The research aims to construct the measurement index of ownership structure stability,and to study the impact of state-owned enterprises ownership structure stability on state-owned capital gains,and to discuss the capital structure,ownership structure and dividend policy under the condition of optimal capital allocation in order to give effective suggestions on making state-owned enterprises more powerful in the perspective of property accounting.The first chapter studies the aim,background,concepts,problems,significance,methods,content,thinking,innovation and shortcoming.The second and third chapters study domestic and overseas literature and fundamental theories.The fourth chapter reviews the history of state-owned enterprises ownership structure and state-owned capital earning allocation.On the base of review of literature,theories and history,chapters from the fifth to eighth concentrate on the empirical research on the correlation relationship between ownership structure or ownership structure stability and state-owned capital gains.The fifth chapter studies the correlation relationship between ownership concentration and dividend distribution under the impact of some factors.The sixth chapter studies the correlation relationship between ultimate controller ownership and dividend distribution under the impact of some factors.The seventh chapter constructs the ownership stability index and the ownership structure stability index and studies the impact of ownership structure on dividend distribution.The eighth chapter studies optimal interval of capital structure,ownership structure and cash dividend payout ratio under the condition of optimal resource allocation.On the base of normative and empirical research conclusions,the ninth chapter gives systematically policy suggestions on improvement of capital structure,corporate governance and earning allocation of state-owned enterprises in China.There is little literature about ownership stability and less about ownership structure stability.Quantitative measurement on ownership stability or ownership structure stability has not been studied systematically.The innovative conclusions are as follows,(1)Construct the ownership stability index and the ownership structure indexThe ownership stability index and the ownership structure index are constructed and the empirical research on the correlation relationship between ownership structure stability and dividend policy has been made.(2)The optimal interval of capital structure,ownership structure,cash dividend payout ratio?Optimal interval of capital structureThe optimal capital structure exists,the optimal debt rate range is between 55.56%and 73.65%for China's A share listed companies,and the same feature exists for main board listed companies of China's A share.?Optimal interval of state-owned shareholding proportionThe optimal state-owned shareholding proportion range for mixed ownership companies shared but not controlled by state-owned stockholder is(5.01%,15.46%],it is better if the state-owned shareholding proportion approaches 15.46%;the optimal state-owned shareholding proportion range for mixed ownership companies relatively controlled by state-owned stockholder is(32.16%,43.86%],it is better if the state-owned shareholding proportion approaches 32.16%;the optimal state-owned shareholding proportion range for mixed ownership companies absolutely controlled by state-owned stockholder is(74.56%,100%).?Optimal interval of cash flow rights,voting rights,separation between cash flow rights and voting rightsAn inverted U relationship exists between the separation of ownership and control and the firm value,the optimal separation of ownership and control is 6.07%.Cash flow rights has an inverted U relationship with the firm value,the optimal cash flow rights is 22.08%.The optimal voting rights is 28.92%.Cash flow rights influenced by voting rights as the threshold variable has an inverted U relationship with the firm value,when voting rights is 28.88%,cash flow rights maximizes the firm value,and when cash flow rights is greater than 19.44%and less than or equals 22.08%,voting rights influenced by cash flow rights as the threshold variable has minimum negative impact on the firm value.?Optimal interval of cash dividend payout ratioThe dividend payout ratio maximizing the firm value for listed companies of innovation board is no more than 13.86%,the dividend payout ratio has an inverted U curve relationship with the firm value and is 23.9%which can maximize the firm value for small and medium board,an inverted U curve relationship with the firm value still exists and the dividend payout ratio maximizing the firm value is 51.07%for Shanghai exchange main board listed companies.The increasing trend of the dividend payout ratio maximizing the firm value is embodied in above data from innovation board to main board,so the dividend payout ratio maximizing the firm value has the life-cycled characteristics.(3)Policy suggestions on improvement of capital structure,corporate governance and earning distribution in state-owned enterprises in China are given qualitatively and quantitativelyAbove empirical research conclusions are introduced into policy suggestions on reform and development of state-owned enterprises in China,which are getting more practical.