The Mixed Ownership Reform Of State-owned Banks In China

After the “Grand Unification”,professionalization and then the reform on joint-stock system over the years,Chinese state-owned commercial banks have obtained remarkable achievements,improved each performance indicator of banks and initially formed a corporate governance structure with the characteristics of modern enterprises.However,the main problem of Chinese state-owned enterprises is that state-owned assets are nominally owned by all the people,but people cannot directly exercise their ownership of state-owned assets and control of state-owned enterprises.Instead,they need to entrust the government to manage on behalf of themselves,and the government conducts actual management of enterprises by entrusting the agents once again.This problem of “owner absence” has caused the over-long chain of entrusting the agents of state-owned enterprises,which not only restricts the healthy development of state-owned enterprises,but also results in problems such as frequent corruption in state-owned enterprises,low profitability and lack of innovation.Thus,although the operation scale and influence of China's state-owned commercial banks rank top in the world,there is still a clear gap with top banks in the world in the aspects such as operation ability and business innovation.This paper supposes that the development of mixed ownership economy is in accordance with the current situation of China's market economy,and is the only way to establish and improve the modern enterprise system,which is beneficial to the deepening of China's reform on state-owned commercial banks,the improvement of resource allocation efficiency and the strengthening of international competitiveness.This paper is divided into seven chapters,and the specific contents are as follows:Chapter 1 is the introduction,including the research background and significance of this paper,literature reviews home and abroad,research ideas and research methods,main contents,structural framework and possible innovation and deficiencies.Chapter 2 is the related theoretical basis of mixed ownership reform.Thischapter sorts out the theoretical basis of mixed ownership reform,including the problem of transaction cost,principal-agent theory,problem of incomplete contract and the game theory.Chapter 3 introduces the evolution of the ownership of Chinese state-owned commercial banks,arranges the evolution from “Grand Unification” unified bank system to the establishment of specialized banks and to the reform on the joint-stock system,and analyzes the achievements obtained by the reform on the ownership of state-owned commercial banks in the aspects such as the diversification of property rights,introduction of overseas strategic investors,establishment of modern enterprise system and improvement of financial indicators.It finally sums up the main characteristics of the ownership reform of state-owned commercial banks.Chapter 4 presents the analysis of the revenue of mixed ownership reform of Chinese state-owned commercial banks,and expounds it from three aspects,i.e.the benefits of mixed ownership reform on improving the core competitiveness of state-owned banks,keeping the full competitiveness of the banking industry and promoting the factor market.Chapter 5 is an empirical analysis on the economic performance and business innovation of mixed ownership reform and Chinese state-owned commercial banks.Through the empirical analysis on the performance of the four state-owned commercial banks and twelve listed joint-stock banks in 2006-2015 and the empirical test of the level of mixed ownership,the relationship between bank performance and business innovation is obtained.Chapter 6 illustrates the obstacles of the mixed ownership reform.On the one hand,this chapter sorts out the obstacles of the mixed ownership reform respectively caused by high transaction cost,asset specificity and moral hazard in principal-agent as well as game analysis on mixed ownership reform by combining with the western economic theories.On the other hand,the cost and revenue of state-owned commercial banks in the mixed ownership reform are analyzed,the possible value-at-risks,decision-making risks and integration risks in the process of reform are elucidated,and the main measures of preventing the above risks are put forward.Chapter 7 presents the path of the mixed ownership reform on Chinesestate-owned commercial banks.The suggestions on realizing the marketization of state-owned commercial banks are put forward according to the theoretical basis of the mixed ownership reform,the existing problems of China's state-owned commercial bank and the risks need to guard against in the previous chapters,and the main countermeasures include cultivating qualified market entity,constructing a sound market system,establishing effective market rules and creating legalized market environment.