Research On Farmers' Credit Improvement Mechanism Of External Financing Of Agricultural Supply Chain

With the development of supply chain management,global economic competition has turned from the individual and individual competition into the supply chain and supply chain competition.The survival and development of an enterprise is no longer dependent solely on its own competitiveness,but more importantly,depends on the operational efficiency of all members in the supply chain.However,given the inherent weak nature of farmers,farmers' credit deficiency in our country has seriously restricted the construction of competitive advantage of agricultural supply chain.How to alleviate the financing constraints of farmers has become a hot topic in agricultural supply chain management.As an innovative rural financial service,external financing of agricultural supply chain(EFASC)has received extensive attention from academia and government.Theoretically speaking,EFASC has positive effect on vulnerable members' credit availability and supply chain value.And the government has also promulgated a number of policies to support EFASC.However,EFASC is only participated by a limited number of enterprises and farmers.Clarifying the credit improvement mechanism of EFASC is the prerequisite to optimize EFASC's process and enhance the competitive advantage of supply chain.Hence,this paper takes "credit" as the entry point,and uses theoretical model and econometric method to discuss the farmers' credit improvement mechanism and performance of EFASC.By summarizing the operational characteristics of EFASC,this paper finds that the difference between EFASC and conventional loan is that EFASC can make use of peer selection,peer monitoring and commercial incentive to make up conventional loan's screening,monitoring and incentive failure dilemma.Therefore,this paper first analyzes the effect of peer selection,peer monitoring and incentive mechanism on farmers credit based on principal-agent model and repeated dynamic game analysis.Then,through Bivariate probit model,Multinomial logit model and IV regression,this paper evaluates the whole credit improvement performance of EFASC considering the sample selection problem and the endogenous problem.The main conclusions areas follows:First,the company's recommendation or guarantee can be regarded as an improvement of farmers'ex ante signal transmission capacity and improve the farmers' credit.The greater the amount of real information of the recommendation has,the stronger the information advantage the enterprise has,the easier EFASC becomes to live up peer selection effect.Second,the effect of peer monitoring on farmers' credit is realized through the alleviation of ex post information asymmetry.As our rural credit market is changing from monopolistic to competitive,the effect of peer monitoring on farmers' credit is becoming increasingly complex.However,the enhancement of peer monitoring's efficiency and company's spontaneous monitoring motivation can always be beneficial to the peer monitoring effect of EFASC.Thirdly,the strategic default willingness is the main path of incentive mechanism affecting farmers'credit.Compared with the conventional loan,the incentive mechanism of EFASC can reduce the farmers' strategic default willingness and prompt more short-sighted farmers to perform.Fourth,empirical results show that supply chain network alleviates farmers' credit rationing,but the alleviation diminishes with the increase of supply chain network density and the decline in bank concentration.The alleviation of supply-side constraint is the main path of supply chain network affecting credit rationing.Considering supply chain network is the key to EFASC's forming,the empirical results confirm the theoretical impact of EFASC on farmers' credit.