The Empirical Relationship Between Internal Control Information Disclosure Of Chinese Listed Company And Financial Allocation

The distribution of injustice is a hot issue in the practical community,and it is also a prominent issue that theorists attach importance to and focus on." The 'cake' shall be divided well while it's continually getting bigger,otherwise,the contradictions and problems will be more intensified because of the inequitable distribution"(Ping He,2013).In view of the problem of "unfair distribution",this paper studies whether the quality of internal control information disclosure can and how to affect the financial distribution from the enterprise perspective.The demands problem of stakeholders such as government,creditors,shareholders,employees and etc.are involved in the issue of enterprise financial allocation,which is the allocation of enterprise value of the production results,as well as being of great significance to stimulate the vitality of enterprises,improve the efficiency of resource allocation and coordinate the operation of national economy.In order to better realize the stakeholders' right to know and speak in the distribution of enterprise value,to protect their rights and interests,it is the key to disclose the internal control information with certain quality.Therefore,this paper analyzes the economic consequences of the quality of information disclosure in China's listed companies from the perspective of generalized financial allocation based on the theory of stakeholder,and tries to construct and reveal the mechanism and specific path of high quality internal control information disclosure on the impact of financial allocation.With A-share general industry listed companies of 2009-2015 in China being the object of study,this paper uses a variety of statistical methods to test the relationship between the quality of internal control information disclosure and financial distribution,and provides suggestions on improving the quality of internal control information disclosure from the perspectives of corporate,external regulators and stakeholders based on the fairness of financial distribution.With a view to seeking ways to improve the distribution of corporate inequality and provide some advice on managerial governance and stakeholder decision-making.The following main innovations and research content of the paper are as below:First,based on the theory of stakeholder,the mechanism of the influence of internal control information disclosure on generalized financial allocation is constructed.The financial allocation involves the demands of the stakeholders of the enterprise.However,the existing research in our country is a narrow financial allocation,and the financial allocation from the perspective of internal control information disclosure of the literature is rare.Based on stakeholder management theory,this paper argues that the financial allocation should be based on the distribution of the value of the new creation of the firm,which is the generalized financial allocation.High-quality internal control disclosure information has a certain signal transmission and corporate governance functions,can achieve the optimal allocation of resources,reflecting the stakeholders the right to know and the right to speak,is the enterprise value creation,implementation and distribution of the foundation,therefore,is likely to be affected by the quality of internal control information disclosure.In this paper,we use the signal game theory in the incomplete information dynamic game to analyze the game equilibrium that the two sides of the internal control information supply and demand through the decision game,and analyze the profit of the stakeholders through the Nash negotiation promotion model.To a certain extent,this study makes up for the shortcomings of previous financial allocation research,enrich and expand the content and direction of internal control information disclosure quality research.Secondly,this paper uses the three-stage simultaneous equation OLS regression friability to study the relationship between the quality of internal control information disclosure and the progress of corporate tax revenue based on the analysis of the cost and profit of tax avoidance behavior.It is found that the quality of internal control information disclosure and the progress of taxation have the U-shaped feature that is rising first then decrease,and this feature is more pronounced in the mandatory disclosure phase of internal control information.They perform differently on every stage of the enterprise life cycle;the U-shaped feature remains in the growth and maturity period of the enterprise,however,in the recession period,it changes into the inverted U-shape that is decreasing first then rise.This shows that the internal control information disclosure of the "mandatory" will affect the quality of internal control information disclosure,thereby affecting the corporate tax incentives.It shows that the investors will enlarge the "good news" that is brought by high-quality internal control information;while high-quality internal control information can effectively alleviate the agency issues of tax avoidance,reduce the risk of tax avoidance.Balancing revenue and cost,listed companies are more inclined to increase its value by taking radical Tax strategy.Thirdly,Combined with the perspective of resource allocation efficiency,the financial environment into the internal control information disclosure quality of the impact of investment efficiency.China's current financial market there is a financial mismatch phenomenon,that is,the allocation of financial resources in an inefficient state,which will weaken the debt contract on the efficiency of corporate governance,and information asymmetry is the main cause of financial market agents,High-quality internal control information disclosure can improve this problem,making the financial resources flow higher efficiency,the future development of better prospects for the enterprise.This paper analyzes the inherent relationship among financial mismatch,the quality of internal control information disclosure and investment efficiency as well as their heterogeneity under different property rights in depth combining with the view of resource allocation efficiency.The results show that the positive impact of the quality of internal control information disclosure on the efficiency of enterprise investment is mainly to suppress its over-investment.Therefore,the effect of high-quality internal control information on the lack of investment is limited according to our current special financial environment.Fourthly,this paper put the quality of internal control information disclosure and cash dividend distribution into the same research framework for the first time based on the theory of signal transmission and agency.The Logit model is used to test the relationship between the two,along with the Propensity Score Matching method(PSM)and Granger causality test are used to build a model to control the possible endogenous problem of the two.The results support the "results" model of dividend distribution.According to the research,the cash dividend policy of listed companies has a significant positive relationship with the quality of internal control information disclosure,and the relationship between state-owned enterprises and enterprises with high financing constraints is higher than enterprises with low financing constraints.This conclusion supports the "result" model of dividend distribution,it shows that the disclosure of high-quality internal control information can improve the shared benefits of shareholders based on their ownership,and ease the conflict between the shareholders' self interests and the enterprise's overall interests;Also,the bigger the degree of information asymmetry is or the financing problem is in the enterprise,the better that high-quality internal control information plays its shareholder protection effect as a mechanism of interests equilibrium.