China's State-owned Assets Auction Mechanism Design And Collusion Prevention Research

Since the reform and opening,the key switch in state-owned resources system reform are to speed up the reform of Capitalization Stock Right in state-owned enterprise,and to promote management mechanism of state-owned enterprise,and to optimize the allocation of state-owned economy.In the process of the marketization of state-owned asset,how to form the price of the property of state-owned asset is the central link in State-Owned Assets Management.Considering the particularity of the property right of state-owned enterprises in our country,it is far difficult to price the SOE than to price other ordinary goods.And due to lack of standard transfer pricing of state-owned enterprises in China and the limitation in state-owned assets auction mechanism,there are many defects in system of State-Owned Assets Management,such as tacit collusion.Now this situation has aroused widely concern among the learners and governments domestic and abroad.Based on the background,this paper researches on mechanism design for auction of state-owned assets and Collusion-proof has very important theoretical and practical significance.The dissertation bases on the basic theory of modern economics and management science,implements comprehensive analysis and a variety of methods to study the exchange of the state owned enterprise's property rights,the train of thought and main conclusion of this dissertation are as follows:Firstly,we find that China's state-owned property right trade existence many problem,such as information deficiency,black case work,violation operation and by using the data of CHINA Property Right Exchange Sectors.while the key point led to those problems is that the standardization and regulation of the trading operation and auction mechanism in the state-owned property right trading are lacking.This dissertation constructs an elementary analytical framework of SOE auction,Without considering the non-price factors and the principal-agent problem in the SOE's property rights exchange.This dissertation analyzes cases of auction of state-owned property right form 2003 to 2012,It finds that the relation between auction and premium rate of auction is obvious,and British auction can generate more average revenue than the first price sealed auction,but the fluctuation of average revenue of British auction is bigger than the first price sealed auction.The main reason is that it is effective method to solve the problem of asymmetric information and to improve the competitive between biddersand to increase the difficulty of corruption activities,whit increasesing number of bidders.We also found that the final auction property is significant correlation with benefits.The overall property premium rate is higher than the auction part of the property auction premium rate,but the difference was small.Secondly,This paper examines the actual effect that the auction mechanism of state-owned property work..Based on some relevant data from the Yearbook of Chinese property market,this dissertation study on the return of negotiating transfer and auction transfer,and found that it can bring more value by using auction methods to allocate resources.The main reason is that the openness of the auction in the negotiations may effectively prevent or even eliminate asymmetric information and some corrupt behavior.Thirdly,in this dissertation,the double auction theory is applied to auctions of state-owned assets.Based on this theory and its own characteristics of seo auction,we designed the multi-item double auction mechanism,which include Rating rules,filter rules,offer rules,allocation rules and payment rules,to promote the efficiencies of SOE auction.By using the numerical example,we found that the market efficiency under the optimal auction mechanism is 88.89%,so we can infer that the optimal auction mechanism is efficient..Frouthly,The important aim of design of auction mechanism is to prevent collusion.so we theoretically analyze the collusion behavior at frist.According to the feature of the collusion behavior of SOE auction in China,we put some suggestion,for example raise reservation prices;attract more people to participate in biding,pay more attention to the built of the construction and implementation of internal control system,increase the administration punishing strength,standardize auction activities.The main innovation in the dissertation :Firstly,based on modern economics,this dissertation select negotiating transfer and auction for the study,and systematically and completely study the effect of those trade modes on the exchange of state-owned enterprises' property Rights.Whereafter,we explore and utilize current trade cases to verify the conclusion.Secondly,This paper systematically and completely analysis the performance of SOE auction by using cases of state-owned assets and the game theory,and then we designed the multi-item double auction mechanism to promote the efficiencies of SOE auction.At the same time,we designed the Net Trade System and transaction rule for the multi-item double auction mechanism,and we also examine the efficiency of the auction trading mechanism by mean of numerical example.Thridly,We analysis of Collusion Behavior with theoretical model of state-owned assets and actual cases,and we put some suggestion to prevent collusion behavior of SOE auction.