A Multi—perspective Study On The Diversificaition Of Listed Companies In China

Diversification is the company for the use of capital efficiency,expand the size of the company to improve the company's profits an important means,but some diversified operating companies began to return to the main business,embarked on a "return to nuclear" road.At the same time,the diversified companies appeared a rapid decline in the companies' performance level,the stock rate began to fall etc.,the company over-investment,large shareholders misappropriation of funds and other negative effects,making the diversification of small and medium-sized shareholders,creditors and other stakeholders has aroused the attention of domestic researchers.What the impact of the diversificated company will bring has been the core of debating among domestic researchers,corporate diversification-related issues are also the core of operators and researchers.This paper chooses the diversified companies of A-share listed companies as the research samples,and studies on the diversification of listed companies in China from the microeconomic level,and tries to provide theoretical support and adjustment of business strategy for the listed diversificated companies in China.This paper mainly includes two parts,the company diversification bring the incentive effect and constraints.In the first part,this paper studies on Chinese diversified companies in the range of economic and profit levels.This paper constructs a new index to calculate the profit gain level of the diversified companies.The index can directly figure out whether the diversificated companies are more profitable than the specializatied ones.The study found that when the diversification of the company is at a low level,the increase in the level of diversification will significantly improve the scope of the company's economic level,and when the diversification of the company is at a high level,the increase in the level of diversification will significantly reduce the scope of the company's economic level.The profit gain from the diversification will be declined during the imporvement of the diversification.Second,this paper explores whether the diversification can improve the value of the company and reduce the risk of the company by studying the relationship between the diversification level of the company and the company value and the corporate risk.It is found that the impact of the diversification level on the company's value is divided into three stages.When the size of the company's assets is small,the improvement of the diversification level can significantly promote the improvement of the company's value and the "diversification premium".When the scale of assets reaches a certain level,the promotion of the diversification level will diminish the value of the company,and the"discount" phenomenon will appear.With the increase of the scale of the company's assets,the improvement of the diversification level will further damage the company value.At the same time,the impact of diversification on the risk of the company is divided into two stages.When the size of the company's assets is small,the increase of the diversification level will significantly improve the company's risk.When the asset reaches a certain level,the increase of the diversification level will reduce the role of corporate risk.Third,this article chooses the co-insurance effect.This new perspective,as a starting point for studying the capital cost of diversified operating companies,puts forward the measure of co-insurance effect and studies whether there is a co-insurance effect in diversified listed companies in China.This study provides a new perspective and methods.It is found that China's listed companies through a diversified business can get a co-insurance effect,the level of common insurance effect will increase with the diversification level.As the co-insurance effect can play a role in reducing the risk of the company's system,the diversified operating companies with higher insurance levels have lower equity financing costs and thus have lower total capital costs.In the second part,this article chooses two typical agent problems.Based on the existing research,two new theoretical models are established for two kinds of principal-agent problems.The impact of the two types of principal-agent conflicts in the diversified companies is analyzed systematically and the empirical model is carried out verificatly.The study found that,regardless of the actual controller of the company is a manager or the large shareholder,their principal-agent behavior will increase the company's diversification and ultimately the loss of corporate value.However,this paper also finds that the influence of the entrusted agent behavior of the actual controller is not only reflected in the company's diversification level and the company value.The actual controller's behavior has different influence effect on the incentive of the stock.Then,in order to study how to alleviate the agency conflict of diversified companies,this paper starts to analyse the company's supervision mechanism.It is found that the increase of the size of the board of supervisors of the diversified companies and the salary of executives can effectively restrain the actual control of the company by raising the management expenses.The internal supervision mechanism can not effectively suppress the "hollowing out" of the actual controller through the related transaction.The most effective way to curb this behavior is to raise the proportion of the external supervisory mechanism of the proportion of institutional investors.The increase in the size of the board and the increase in the proportion of the institutions can effectively suppress the invalid investment behavior of the actual controller of the companies.The expansion of the size of the directors and the increase in the proportion of the organization's shareholding can be used to curb the actual control of the company to seize the interests of the company to increase the level of diversification and promote the company's value.There are significant differences between high degree of ownership concentration,low concentration of ownership diversified operating companies and specialized companies' oversight mechanisms on the role of the company.