Study On Fiscal Incentives Facing Local Governments In Supply Of Public Services For Environment In China

In China,after more than 30 years of development model of economic growth ahead of environmental protection,diseases caused by environmental pollution in the last ten years have arisen and have showed a significant rising trend.According to"2014 the bulletin on environmental conditions in China",among the 161 cities evaluated by new national air quality standards,only 16 cities are up to the air quality standards while the other 145 cities are down to the standards.The mass events caused by environmental problems have increased at an annual rate of 29.8%,thus the environmental pollution is a great threat to residents' living health and regional social stability.Beside the serious problems of environmental pollution,the Chinese government not only faces pressure from domestic residents but also faces the international demands for reducing carbon emissions.The central government formulates policies of environmental protection and energy-saving and emission-reduction,and appoints the local government as the subject of environmental protection.What can way do to improve the design of relevant systems in the financial system,and to achieve compatibility between the financial interests and the interests of residents?How can government effectively play their tax incentive and constraint function to reduce environmental pollution?These are serious problems which China will face in the near future.In this respect,this thesis makes deep research on this problem in following aspects,which along with the technical route of "theoretical research,system research,empirical study,comparative study,countermeasure research",and integrated use of "literature analysis and information retrieval unifies,quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis,the combination of literature research,comparative analysis and other research methods".First,it's reasonable definition of the theoretical framework for local government fiscal incentive analysis under environmental public services.This article analyzes the theoretical basis of local government's financial intervention of environmental protection and the supply of environmental public service.Then,it explains the formation of China's local government incentives on the background of China's fiscal decentralization from the aspects of expenditure responsibilities,tax powers and transfer payment.Finally,it discusses the special system background of local government fiscal incentive while consider the socio-economic characteristics of Chinese transformation period.Second,it's objective analysis and evaluation of the current situation of local government's public service provision for environment.By dividing environmental services into five types:environmental management service;environmental information service;environmental monitoring service;environmental sanitation service;environmental emergency service,we comb the current situation of these five services.Based on the government data,we measure and compare the efficiency of local environmental public service.Besides,we clarified the characteristics of the supply of environmental public services:the inadequate supply of public service;significant difference between interregional environmental public service;and significant difference between intergroup environmental public service.Third,it's empirical analysis of the distortion of fiscal incentive of local government's environmental public service.By selecting different measures of fiscal decentralization,this chapter analyses the effect of financial management autonomy and transfer on the satisfaction of environmental public service,and the incentive and constraint between fiscal expenditure and transfer payment.Then inspect the impact of environmental taxes and charges on local environmental pollution and the inner mechanism that environmental taxes and charges affect environmental public service.Especially,we summarize the reason why there exists distortion of fiscal incentive of local government's environmental public service:the division of routine power and financial power;division of tax right;transfer payment.Fourth,induction and reference of the experience of developed countries' fiscal incentive of local government's environmental public service.Based on the experience of environment public governance in United States and United Kingdom,we analyses why these developed countries can provide environmental public service that can meet the demand of residence.From the perspective of incentive mechanism of their local public finance,we come to some conclusions that may help enhance China's environmental governance performance,resolve environment risk and improve environmental quality.Fifth,it's the countermeasures and suggestions to redress local government fiscal incentive in the provision of environmental public service.Specifically,Chinese government should re-divide the routine power of environmental public service from the perspective of externality,information asymmetry,scale effect and Incentive compatibility.What's more,the government should define the right of collection and management and the right of use of environmental tax clearly,thus to put forward the process from pollution charge into pollution tax.Apart from improving the system of general transfer payments and the system of special transfer payments,the government should also regulate the competition between local governments,improve the performance appraisal system and reform the environmental management system.