| Capital market has become an extremely important part of the socialist market economy system,and the securities market system is a key link in the construction of China's multi-level capital market.General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that the development of capital market is the direction of China's reform,so improving the governance system of securities market has become the top priority in the development of capital market.The report of the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China points out that socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era,and the main contradictions in our society have been transformed into the contradictions between the people's growing need for a better life and the unbalanced and inadequate development.The ability of financial service entity economy is the key factor to solve the problem of "imbalance and insufficiency" in China's current economic development.Therefore,we must deepen the reform of financial system,strengthen the ability of financial service entity economy,increase the proportion of direct financing,and promote the healthy development of multi-level capital market.At the same time,we should pay attention to improving the financial supervision system and keep the bottom line of no systemic financial risk.The original intention of the system design of securities service institutions in the securities market is to check,verify and audit the company information,ensure the authenticity,accuracy and integrity of the information of listed companies,protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors,and diligent and responsible securities service institutions can not underestimate the accurate positioning of company value,the prevention and control of company risk and the control of the overall risk of the securities market.Use.However,in practice,due to its limitations of restraint mechanism and division of powers and responsibilities,its role is not ideal.Therefore,as an external guarantee of function,it is particularly important to supervise the securities service institutions.How to supervise the securities service institutions through strong external constraints and endogenous motivation is an important goal of supervision.Chapter 1: The theoretical framework of the supervision of securities service institutions.The purpose of this chapter is to define and analyze the securities service institutions themselves in order to improve the pertinence and effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism.Firstly,the scope and characteristics of securities service institutions are theoretically defined.The information transmission,professionalism,independence,accountability and clustering characteristics of securities service institutions are the basis for defining the rights and responsibilities of securities service institutions,as well as the important standards and objectives of supervision.The analysis of their inherent characteristics is the premise for carrying out the power and responsibility analysis of securities service institutions and the ultimate goal of supervision.Pursuit.Secondly,the historical causes of the role of securities service institutions are analyzed.The emergence and development of securities service institutions are the result of the combination of various factors.Starting from the characteristics of information asymmetry in the securities market,they need intermediaries to play the role of information transmission.From the perspective of reducing transaction costs,securities service institutions can make full use of their advantages to connect the parties involved in the transaction and decision makers to effectively reduce transaction costs.Finally,from the perspective of company supervision.From the perspective of challenge,securities service institutions,as external supervision,are an innovation of the internal supervision strategy widely adopted at present.By changing the essence of the relationship between supervision and being supervised,the efficiency of corporate supervision can be improved.These are the important support for the development of securities service institutions,as well as the important basis for the supervision of securities service institutions.On the contrary,the supervision of securities service institutions is essentially to ensure that they can fully play the role of information transmission,cost reduction and innovation.Finally,the restraint mechanism of securities service institutions is analyzed.The premise of effective supervision is to comprehensively grasp the restraint mechanism of the supervising object itself,which is an important aspect of realizing "teeth" supervision.The restraint mechanism of securities service institutions mainly includes reputation restraint mechanism,responsibility restraint mechanism.The preconditions and modes of each restraint mechanism are different.Reputation restraint mechanism is mainly within the securities service institutions industry,and it is an endogenous and spontaneous restraint form.The responsibility restraint mechanism is a restraint way to achieve overall balance through external forces.Two different restraint mechanisms represent two different restraint forces of the market and the state respectively.Chapter 2: Functional orientation and responsibility clarification of securities service institutions.This chapter mainly defines the functions and responsibilities of securities serviceinstitutions,and analyses them from macro-functional orientation and micro-type of obligations.Although supervision is normalized,the standards adopted by different supervision measures are different.Specifically,we should grasp the performance of the obligation of securities service institutions,i.e.diligence and due diligence.As the third party execution mechanism of securities market,securities service institutions are intermediaries between the two sides of the transaction,and their responsibilities are different from those of the two sides of the transaction.There are certain overlaps in business,and there are overlaps among the securities service agencies,so the degree of the securities service agencies as a third party intrusion needs to be strictly considered,and they need to play their supervisory role under the premise of the effectiveness of internal supervision.At the same time,from the perspective of maximizing the utility of securities service institutions,the goal of responsibility sharing should be to give consideration to both deterrence and guidance,and set different regulatory requirements on this premise.Therefore,this determines the nature of the responsibilities of securities service institutions.From the perspective of practice,it has obvious service,but from the perspective of its strategic choice,it has obvious passivity.However,there are various dilemmas in the allocation of responsibilities of securities service institutions.At the macro level,the confusion of responsibilities between the market and the government leads to the inadequate control and regulation of the market and government forces in the process of exerting the role of securities service institutions;at the meso level,the collusion problems caused by the lack of self-interest and competition among institutions;and at the micro level,the responsibilities of the institutions themselves are set up.Layers of contradictions.In practice,the obligation of securities service institutions is mainly the duty of diligence and due diligence.Typical analysis includes theduty of loyalty,duty of care and duty of prudence.Chapter 3: Empirical review and Reflection on the current situation of the supervision of securities service institutions in China.The logic of this chapter follows the analysis of the current supervision from micro-present situation to macro-design.Firstly,starting with the current situation of supervision and punishment cases of securities service institutions,this paper makes an overall analysis of the existing means of supervision and punishment.Secondly,it reflects on the current situation of supervision,mainly from the legislative and law enforcement levels.Finally,from the micro-analysis of the status quo to the analysis of the causes of the current regulatory anomie,mainly including the dislocation of legal relations,distorted market order,lack of self-regulation and inadequate responsibility mechanism.The dislocation of legal relationship is analyzed from the contradiction between the legal status of securities service institutions and their investor protection obligations.The distortion of market order is mainly caused by the inadequate market competition in the securities service institutions,which leads to monopoly in the industry,and to a large extent inhibits the role of reputation mechanism.The lack of self-regulation is mainly aimed at the current situation that the supervision of securities service institutions pays too much attention to administrative supervision and lacks the application of self-regulation.It is necessary for China's securities service institutions to strengthen self-regulation in terms of their own institutional characteristics or existing regulatory problems.Finally,from the perspective of illegal costs,the current liability restraint mechanism leads to low illegal costs,so many securities service institutions choose to take risks.Chapter 4: Idea selection of supervision of securities service institutions.For the system construction,the most important is the concept of system construction,that is,what kind of goal a system should achieve,what kind of functions the system should have to achieve the goal,and what kind of mechanism these functions can be achieved.The basis of positioning the concept of supervision of securities service institutions is the power game between government regulation and market restraint.The concept of supervision of securities service institutions needs to determine the power boundary between government and market on the basis of investigating the existing regulatory basis,the characteristics of regulatory objects and the positioning of regulatory objectives.At the same time,it also needs to meet the supervision under the conditions of comprehensive corporate capacity,financing standards and other factors.Requirements for adaptability.The standard of good supervision of securities service institutions should satisfy the characteristics of foresight,flexibility and mandatory at the same time,and divide the reasonable limitations of supervision with "cost-benefit" as the core.At the same time,in the context of the new era,it is an important aspect of financial regulatory reform to pay attention to the balance between the role of the market and the government.Under the premise of marketization,how to maximize the effectiveness of the government is an important part of the regulatory effect.On the one hand,we should pay attention to the role of the government,on the other hand,we should pay attention to the expansion of market supervision.From the point of view of the substitution between government and market,the market still does not have the premise of replacinggovernment,and the role of government should be positioned in the position of market judge to a greater extent.The expansion of market regulation mainly depends on the expansion of self-regulation,which is consistent with market requirements.Chapter 5: Improvement of the regulatory mechanism of securities service institutions in China.From the theoretical and empirical analysis,the current supervision of securities service institutions should not only focus on the handling of basic legal relations,but also on the construction of institutional mechanisms.Firstly,in view of the misplacement of principal relationship,we should proceed from the responsibility intention of securities service institutions to realize the transformation of appointment of securities service institutions from private to public.Secondly,considering the type of existing regulatory model,administrative supervision has almost exhausted its ability in the construction of the model.We can consider expanding the effectiveness of self-regulation,and establish a special association of securities service agencies as a self-regulatory organization to effectively avoid the shortcomings of current self-regulation and ensure the effect of self-regulation.Finally,the liability restraint mechanism should be the most disciplinary part of supervision,but the fact is that the current liability mechanism is not deterrent at all.On the one hand,we should establish a comprehensive liability system,on the other hand,we should optimize the existing fault liability principle,especially in the case of cross-reference.At the same time,we should pay attention to the application of exemption. |
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