Research On The Implementation Deviation Of Land Binding Index Control Policy From Intergovernmental Game Perspective

Sincethe reform and opening up,our country’s economic and society has been in a rapid development,which caused the problems of fast consumption in land,minerals,energy and water resources etc.In 2006,the 11th five-year plan has established five items about resource and environment binding index to strengthen resource and environment controlling like using land,pollutant discharge,energy consumption and so on.In the 12th five-year plan,it has extended to seven items.The Recommendations of CPC Central Committee on the Formulation of the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development issued in Nov.2015,states further that we should save and high-efficient use of resources,and strengthen binding index management etc.Therefore,the resource and environment binding index,being as a core content of space planning,will become an important tool to promote the local realize resources saving and environmental friendliness.Land binding index management policy is an important public policy in land management.It also plays an important role in keeping the red line of cultivated land,and carrying out macro-control of land.But this policy has produced obvious implementation deviation during actual execution.For example,taking up superior and filling up inferior in the supplementary of cultivated land index or living beyond land’s means in newly-added construction land,it caused that part of the index has broken through the end period goal during the medium term of land plan,which seriously damaged the effectiveness of policies.The implementation deviation of a public policy must have beneficiaries,victims and other stakeholders,which provides a proper perspective to discuss policy implementation deviation problem from a framework of interest game.The implementation of land binding index management policy will go through all-level governments from centre government all the way to local government,and not only the land inspector department but also other department will join in during this time.What’s more,their differentiation responsibilities and interests will make the process of policy implementation presenting a typical feature of a multi-player game situation.So to analyze theimplementation deviation mechanism of land binding index from a inter-governments competition view has an important theoretical and practical significance to solve the problem of policy implementation deviation.The research of this dissertation is mainly carried out along the thought of "theoretical framework,problem diagnosis,mechanism analysis and governance strategy":Firstly,the dissertation is based on the institutional background of policy implementation to analyze the game relationship of policy implementation’s core subject inthe horizontal and vertical dimensions,and constructs a theoretical framework of china’s decentralization,inter-governments competition and the implementation of land binding index management policy.The result shows that:l)China’s decentralization is the basic institutional background of understanding our country’s inter-governments competition.On one hand it helps forming a competitive relation between horizontal governments,on the other hand it makes vertical governments from centre to local form a principal-agent relationship.2)the core subject of land binding index management implementation includes centre government,provincial government,city and county government and land inspector organization,and their character,responsibility and interests are different.Among them,the centre government is policy maker whose purpose is to protect cultivated land and ensure national food security;the provincial government belongs to supervisor.It has a pair of conflicting goals,that is,they have to ensure the policies are well implemented in their province while striving for as much newly-added construction land as possible;city and county governments is policy performer.It’s primary goal is to striving for enough newly-added construction land for this area,followed by strictly implementing policy.The land inspector is also belonging to supervisor.Their responsible is supervising the policy implementation situation of local government.And their purpose is to achieve a good performance.3)Because there are conflicts between the character,responsibility and interests of policy implementation core subject,inter-governments has formed two kind of competition relationship during policy implementation,as follows:the first is horizontal inter-government competition relationship,the second is vertical inter-government collusion relationship.Both of them explain the mechanism of policy implementation deviation from two sides that is incentive sources and constraint solving and constitute the theoretical framework of this dissertation.Secondly,this dissertation diagnoses the current situation of land binding index management implementation deviation,and the result shows that:l)the implementation deviation of land binding index management policy is mainly reflected in three indexes,respectively,newly increased construction occupying cultivated land scale,urban and rural construction land scale and per capita industrial and urban construction land.Among them,the index of newly increased construction occupation of cultivated land scale has been used over 90%of planned volume until the end of 2015;the index of urban and rural construction land scale has broken the targeted value at the end of 2014;the index of per capita industrial and urban land has been over the targeted value of 22 square per person at the end of 2015 and it is still keeping a slow growth trend under planning period.3)local government have the following behavior preference in policy implementation:on one side they try their best to enlarge urban and rural construction land scale,which lead to a faster using of newly increased construction land index,and a breaking through of urban and rural construction land scale and per capita urban and industrial land index;on the other side,landreclamation and re-development is carried out on a large scale to achieve the goal of cultivated land protection in a high standard,but it has ignored the quality goal of cultivated land protection.What’s more,the analysis is based on the purpose and method of horizontal inter-government competition,states the effect of vertical horizontal inter-government competition on policy implementation deviation and constructs spatial econometric models to test the hypothesis.The result shows that:1)under the system of china’s decentralization,centre government put political promotion local officials together with economic performance,which to some extent makes horizontal inter-governments promotion competition become GDP growth,fiscal revenue and other economic development competition.2)due to the limitation of tenure,local officials generally only seek those who can become effective achievement in a short time,so they will tendentiously implement part of the policies which is coincidence with local interests in order to attract scarce capital elements such as investments and tax revenue flowing into local in a short time;but the huge bonus brought by land finance and land investment in a short time promote them take part in the competition by making full use of land to make money and attract investment.3)to avoid falling behind in economic competition,local governments need to do as much as possible to enlarge the scale of land finance and investment.Therefore,to get extra newly-added construction land space,they will compete to distort the pilot policy,complain to superior to get special care and use other policy implementation strategies such as illegal use of land;this kind of "race" policy implementation interaction will put the horizontal inter-governments into a kind of "prisoners’dilemma"game equilibrium,which will make widespread of policy implementation deviation.4)the empirical analysis result shows that there is competition of making land finance and land investment scale larger in horizontal governments,which makes this area’s land finance and land investment produce positive special overflow.It means that it will not only aggravate the policy implementation deviation degree of this area but also aggravate neighbor areas’ policy implementation deviation;compared with land finance,the effect on special overflow of land investment is more obvious and it has greater influence on policy implementation deviation.The empirical results verify that the economic competition method,making money and getting investment by land,between horizontal governments is an important incentive source for policy implementation deviation.Then,this dissertation bases on the analysis for the vertical inter-governments relation of our country’s land administration system to state the collusion mechanism between policy implementer and inspector and to construct P-S-A three level agency model analyzing inter-governments collusion’s influence on policy implementation deviation.The results show that:1)after several times of land administration system reform in our country,vertical governments is no longer a simple "client and agency"relation between centre and local governments,but a multi-layer relation-client,supervision and agency.2)under the isomorphic responsibility of the above and the lower level governments,there is a strong mutual interests in economic growth between provincial government and city&county governments.Because of the relationship of associated benefit,the provincial governments regarded as supervisor may conspire with city&county governments and loosen supervision;land inspector organization has the defects of power and responsibility asymmetry.To get a better performance,the land inspectors need provincial government’s strong governance on local area to put pressure on city&county governments,so provincial governments can ask land inspector organization moderately loosening supervision to get more land for city&county governments.Due to the relation of exchange interests,the land inspector organization regarded as supervisor still may conspire with city&county governments and loosen supervision,which will bring city&county governments’ policy implementation deviation into real.3)under the structure of client,supervision and agency,the centre government being as client can theoretically design a kind of mechanism to avoid collusion,but due to facing the choice of development and protection,they have to consider high costs in supervision and the difficult situation of the third party supervision is also existed,which make it uneconomical to avoid collusion.So centre government often chooses to tolerate collusion,and it leads to vertical governments forming a kind of equilibrium of the collusion.In the end it causes the implementation deviation of policy.Finally,according to the mechanism of inter-governments competition caused the implementation deviation of land binding index management policy,this dissertation from the angle of constructing compatible inter-governments competition relation puts forward a strategy of management policy implementation deviation,and give specific suggestions on system reform.The results shows that:1)to guarantee the good implement of land binding index management policy,the Incentive compatibility competition relationship should be constructed during the implementation of policy,that is to say,one side we should stimulate inter-governments competition from "race" to "contending" of implementation policy,on the other side,encourage vertical supervisors to be strict to supervisee.2)constructing compatible inter-governments competition relation mainly includes the following specific institutional arrangement:reforming the performance evaluation system by strengthening the quality of economy growth assessment and setting differentiation performance indicators;reforming financial distribution system by adjustment land revenue-sharing between centre and local governments and reasonable allocation property and authority right between centre and local govermments;reforming land supervision by promoting legal construction of land supervision and improving the independence of land supervision;reforming public supervision system by expanding the scope of public information and improving information feedback quality.