| Managerial labor market is advanced part of the labour market, bear the configuration professional managers the most important function of human capital.According to the method of Fama and Jenson for managers market theory, effective managerial labor market can play the role of incentive and supervision of professional managers, can effectively alleviate the agency problem. managerial labor market originated in western developed market economic system, and have a relatively complete legal and the running environment of form a complete set of legal culture, etc.Developed market economy country managers of market allocation of professional manager is the decisive factor of human capital market. Western scholars tend to be within the framework of principal-agent theory investigation company governance mechanism of manager’s incentive and constraint effect.Less involved the study of managerial labor marketoperation mechanism.Based on the principal-agent theory on the basis of introducing the theory of executive power, salary decision theory, the theory of supply and demand theory and price theory and Chinese managers market operation mechanism research framework.Under this article theoretically expand the principal-agent theory paradigm managers incentive and constraint mechanism research, trying to provide theory basis for consummates our country managers market management and guidance. Managers market in China began early in the reform of state-owned enterprises to the actual management of decentralization incentives, grew up in the rapid development of private economy, its evolution process is closely connected with the process of our economic system reform.After nearly 30 years of growth and development, our country managerial labor marketalready have the basic functions, but still exist such problems as market segmentation, risk control. Along with the deepening of economic mechanism reform and cultivate a unified open market competition order managers in promoting soe reform deepening and important realistic significance in the process of private economy prosperity gradually highlights.The current reform of state-owned enterprise executives of market orientation is an urgent need to provide intellectual support well-functioning managers market. So in-depth research of the operation situation of managerial labor marketof our country has a profound practical significance. Market mechanism is the inner loop of the market economy system, mainly by supply and demand mechanism, competition mechanism and price mechanism of core content.Price is the core of market mechanism, a signal to the market’s supply and demand, price affects market participation main body behavior. Through the guidance of the regulation of market price reasonable allocation of resources.Competition mechanism through the guidance of trade fair competition between the two sides realize the rational allocation of resources, achieve the result of evolution, the evolution is the market play a role in the allocation of resources in the basic law. The supply and demand mechanism reflect the inner connection of supply and demand with price, supply and demand both sides on the basis of supply and demand changes constantly adjust the production and business operation activities, guide people, goods, content in the configuration of the whole society. Based on the theoretical foundation and realistic problem driven by conducting empirical research of the operation mechanism of managerial labor marketof our country.From the perspective of external governance mechanism, build empirical research framework to test the effectiveness of the managerial labor marketof our country corporate governance. Managerial labor marketoperation mechanism in order to build the system of research, based on managers’compensation as the breakthrough point research managerial labor marketprice mechanism running status;To managers’passive change of managerial labor marketcompetition mechanism to run the status quo, research and the managerial labor marketsubdivision of manager’s incentive and constraint managerial labor marketdemand and market supply from two aspects. Managerial labor marketincentive and restraint of managers in examining the effect factors on the basis of the introduction of the internal governance mechanism, makes a research on the company’s internal governance factors managers market effect of the regulation of the effectiveness of corporate governance.Thus the company internal and external governance mechanism on a frame, a comprehensive system of the corporate governance of our country managers market is effective and the status quo of managerial labor marketoperation mechanism.This research is divided into three main studies:study 1 focuses on managerial labor marketdemand over executive pay and the influence of passive change.Respectively from the enterprise scale, diversification, past performance and corporate growth four dimensions measurement managers the demand of the market. Main research conclusions are:(1) managers market demand has significant positive effects on managers’pay, and the same conclusion in soe samples significantly.(2) in the enterprise scale, diversification and performance and growth of four dimensions to measure managers market demand has significant positive effect on compensation (3) managers in the enterprise scale and market demand results on the two dimensions of managers’ passive change has significant effect.This shows that managers’ market price is significantly positive influence by market demand, the influence of managers to satisfy the demand of the market competition scale and performance are mainly concentrated in two dimensions,study 2 main investigation managerial labor market supply of managers’ compensation and the effect of passive change. Number in the same industry in other company executives as proxy variable of managerial labor market supply, the empirical research on market supply effects on managers’ compensation and passive change. Main results are:(1) market supply increases significantly reduced the managers’ pay.(2) the managers market supply impact on managers’passive change significantly in the whole sample and non state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises is the result of the sample was not significant. Combined with the child the conclusion of study 1 can managers market price mechanism, increase in demand, prices rise, the supply increases the price is reduced. While managers market competition mechanism run smoothly enough.study 3 company internal governance factors regulating effect of managerial labor market governance effectiveness. Select power variable size of the board of supervisors and managers empirically its formula of managerial labor market governance effectiveness of regulating effect. Main findings are:(1) managers’power managerial labor market governance effectiveness of regulating effect is significant. From the point of empirical results, managers’ power of managerial labor market demand and the relationship between managers’ compensation in the enterprise scale dimensions all the samples and sample state-owned enterprises significantly; Diversity in three dimension samples were significantly; Business performance and growth dimensions only SOE samples is obvious. (2) the joining together of two job lead to the problem of agency for more prominent in the state-owned enterprises.(3) the joining together of two position to interact with the enterprise scale in the full sample and non-state sample has significant inhibitory effect; Managers’ power of managerial labor market supply and the regulating effect of managers’ compensation empirical results only in the state-owned enterprises in the sample. Dimension (4) the size of the board of supervisors in the diversification of managerial labor market demand and the relationship between managers’ compensation adjustment in different ownership enterprises has significant difference. Size of the board of supervisors in state-owned enterprises samples significantly inhibited the corporate diversification and positive relationship between managers’ compensation, rather than the sample size of the board of supervisors in state-owned enterprises was significantly enhanced enterprise diversification a positive relationship with the managers’ compensation. (5) the size of the board of supervisors of managerial labor market demand the adjustment effect of managers’ passive change relations research results show that the size of the board of supervisors in corporate performance dimensions weakens the passive change performance and managers’ role. Boss company board of supervisors to supervise the managers’ performance effect only effective in samples of non-state-owned enterprises. Managerial labor market supply (6) the size of board of supervisors strengthen significantly negative effect on pay. The board of supervisors of listed companies in China to the managers’ compensation in a reasonable manner according to the market supply of supervision.In this paper, the empirical study of Chinese managers market effectiveness of corporate governance, and examines the basic operating mechanism of managerial labor market in China. Introduced the wages theory of classical economics and the price theory of supply and demand analysis our country managers market price mechanism and competition mechanism, to make up for the principal-agent theory in explaining executive compensation and executive changes. In this paper, the results of the study on Chinese managers market governance has a guiding significance in practice, for Chinese enterprises to improve corporate governance provides a theoretical basis and guidance, also provide beneficial for the state-owned enterprises’ compensation and hiring of practical experience and theoretical basis. |
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