A Study On The Tax Competition Among Local Governments In China In The Perspective Of Spatial Statistical Analysis

Reviewed the past 30 years of reform and opening up,China's rise goes beyond everyone's expectations.China has grown into a multi-dimensional country in condition that it has undeveloped technology,low per capita resources and backward infrastructure.It is a miracle.But what makes the long-term and rapid development of China's economy?Some scholars,in perspective of economics,believe that the capital factor is the main drive in China's high-speed economic growth,that technological innovation is the second,that institutional factors also play a role,and that contribution of human capital is relatively small.However,these empirical studies mainly describe the fact that China is in rapid economic growth after the reform and opening up,but it cannot explain the deep-seated reasons for China's development.Considering North's pioneering work in the Institutional Vicissitude Theory,more and more researchers began to focus the role institutional factors in promoting a country's development,and gradually realized that local government's competition was the deep reason for China's rapid development.High-speed economic growth benefits from the Opening policy,and the contribution of capital is a key to safeguarding China's economic take-off.Moreover,the game between the central government and local governments in addition to the game between local governments is the deep impetus.As the leader of regional economic development,local governments take measures,among which the tax policy is the most effective means,to compete for resources in order to promoting local economic growth.Therefore,the study of tax competition between local governments has become an important way to analyze the rapid development since the reform and opening up.On condition of resources shortage,the expansion of local government power will inevitably lead to more intense tax competition.On the one hand,tax competitions among local governments will contribute to regional economic development,and enhance the enthusiasm of local governments to develop the economy;On the other hand,that local governments put too much reliance on tax competition to attract liquidity will lead to excessive tax competition.As a result,it will not only reduce the tax revenue,but also exacerbates the financial expenditure difficulties,and even leads to a series of social and economic problems,such as the imbalance of regional economic development and unemployment.Therefore,this paper studies the tax competition between local governments in China and the effects of local government tax competition.It has practical significance to standardize the intergovernmental tax competition and form a better tax competition environment.Based on the above analysis,the paper focuses on Chinese local government strategy development,tax competition and tax competition in the interaction between factor mobility effects and other issues at the level of horizontal tax competition.Specifically,including the following parts:The first chapter firstly introduces the background which is theoretical and practical meanings of this paper;defines some relevant core concepts and reviews related literatures of tax competition;then bring forth the research contents,research framework and research methods;and finally,proposes the possible innovations of this paper.The second chapter,firstly,examines the main body,object and carrier of local government competition.Secondly,it analyzes the logic of tax competition among local governments.Based on the introduction of the relationship between time and space,this chapter reconstructs the interactive mechanism of tax competition among local governments in China.Finally,this chapter gives a brief description of the impact of tax competition.In the third chapter,the paper uses some statistical analysis methods such as kernel density estimation,exploratory spatial data analysis and cluster analysis to explore the current situation and spatial-temporal characters of tax competition among local governments in China from 1994 to 2014,finding the existence of tax competition.In the fourth chapter,strategic interaction of tax competition among local governments is examined.On the basis of the network mechanism of tax competition among local governments,this chapter tries to give a suitable spatial weight characterization of the interaction among local governments,and examines the strategy of tax competition by using the dynamic spatial durbin panel data model.It reveals that the tax policy of the provincial government has evident path dependence,and there is a strategy of mutual imitation between the government tax competitions.In addition,it also reveals that inter-government competition can produce spillovers through various channels and ultimately have an impact on their tax competition.The fifth chapter analyzes the characteristics of spatial interconnection network of tax competition from the perspective of network.By using social network analysis,this chapter interprets the characteristics of spatial correlation network of tax competition among provincial governments in China from 1994 to 2014,finding that tax competition among China's provincial-level intergovernmental is widespread,and each provincial government has its own status in the network.In addition,it also finds that there are significant spatial clustering characteristics in the network,while different plate plays a different role in it.The sixth chapter uses the dynamic dual-weight spatial durbin panel data model to explore the interregional capital mobility effect of tax competition among 29 provincial local governments in China from 1994 to 2014.This chapter finds that the tax competition among local governments has a huge impact on capital formation.Capital formation is not only negatively related to local macro tax burden,but itself has a specific path dependence characteristic,that is,capital accumulation can strengthen itself.Furthermore,it also finds that joining the WTO has a great influence on the tax competition.The seventh chapter corresponded to the sixth chapter mainly examines the impact of tax competition among local governments on informal employment from the perspective of spatial analysis.The results show that the informal employment has evident path dependence in time and positive spillover effect in space.Most importantly,the local macro tax burden does have a positive correlation with informal employment.The eighth chapter is a conclusion.It puts forward some suggestions on how to improve the tax competition between local governments,how to promote regional investment,and how to adjust the informal employment guidance and other aspects of policy enlightenment.In the end,this chapter proposes some further topics for future study.The all above content is mainly in empirical analysis,besides normative analysis.It also adopts qualitative analysis,quantitative analysis,horizontal and vertical comparative analysis and crossover study methods of social network analysis.By analyzing the present development status,interaction strategy and effect on capital and informal employment of China's tax competition between local governments at the provincial level,which aims to give us a deeper understanding of tax competition among local governments in China.In light of a huge number of related studies,this paper tries to make some innovations.Firstly,this paper reconstructs the interactive mechanism of tax competition among local governments in China,trying to provide a formula to cover the shortage in the empirical analysis.Secondly,the paper not only applies dynamic spatial Durbin panel model and social network analysis to examine tax competition,but also creatively applies spatial statistical analysis method to tax competition,aiming to provide an original view for balancing the local government tax competition.Thirdly,this paper initially explores the impact of tax competition on informal employment,which is more significant for Chinese current situation.