Research On China's Flexible Capital Regulation Of Commercial Banks Based On Basel ?

The outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 triggered the reflection on the original financial supervision system and extensive discussions on financial supervision reform all over the world.Prior to the crisis,institutional flaws such as procyclical problems in bank capital regulation caused the accumulation of risks in the banking system and led to the formation of financial crisis.Therefore,the reform of capital regulation became the core content of the reform of financial regulation after the crisis.The Basel Committee issued Basel III in December 2010.The Basel III framework was implemented with leverage ratio regulation,counter-cyclical capital buffering,and the requirement for higher loss absorbability of systemically important banks.Reforms and supplements to Basel III were made for several times.The banking regulation department in China has actively carried out reforms in capital regulation in light of the capital regulation framework in Basel III and the actual situation in China,and has also made some progress.This paper first analyzes the theory of flexible capital regulation and expounds the basic meanings of the flexible capital regulation,including the process of derivation of concepts,the definition of concepts,and the relationship between elasticized capital regulation and macro-prudential capital regulation.On this basis,the author summarizes the main contents of Basel III's capital regulation reform,analyzes the flexibility of its regulatory reform,and illustrates the internal mechanism of Basel III's flexible capital regulation measures.Then,it summarizes China's capital regulatory reforms,analyzes the elasticity of China's capital regulatory reforms,and compares them with Basel III's flexible capital regulation.During this process,it finds that some problems still exist even flexible capital regulation is implemented.Furthermore,the feasible solution and methods are put forward.In accordance with the systemic importance of commercial banks,the corresponding additional capital requirements are important part of elastic capital regulation to guard against systematic risk in spatial dimensions.This requires appropriate approaches to assess the systemic importance of banks,but at present,domestic regulatory authorities have not yet determined the method of assessing the importance of commercial banking systems.In this regard,the dissertation proposes a method for assessing the importance of commercial banks based on system integrity.Starting from the overall system,this paper analyzes the systemic risk-inducing mechanism of the banking industry,and examines the external impact of the system and the internal infection of the system.Taking account of the total losses suffered by banks and their depositors in the system when measuring systemic risks,and uses the Shapley value to calculate the bank's contribution to systemic risks,in order to assess the systemic importance of commercial banks.On this basis,a method of calculating the additional capital requirements isdesigned based on the results of systematic importance assessment,and the tools and methods of flexible capital regulation are supplemented.Since 2016,the People's Bank of China has started to implement a macro-prudential assessment(MPA).The macro-prudential capital adequacy ratio indicator is an important assessment indicator for the MPA system.It includes counter-cyclical buffer capital,reserve capital,and systemic-important additional capital.Capital adequacy assessment based on macro-prudential capital adequacy ratio is a useful practice of China's flexible capital regulation.It is necessary to test itsrationality and effectiveness.The paper adopts an empirical analysis method to analyze the effect of flexible capital regulation in the People's Bank of China's MPA assessment.The results show that the flexible capital regulation has certain effects on the capital adjustment of commercial banks and the control of credit growth control,but the regulation of leverage ratio still needs improvement.By comparing the elasticity characteristics of Basel III and China's capital regulation,it was found that Basel III implemented a flexible leverage ratio regulation in the spatial dimension,which is necessary to analyze and discuss its applicability in China.On the other hand,the empirical test of the effectiveness of the flexible capital regulation finds out that leverage ratio regulation has no significant effect on the bank's risk adjustment,and there is still room for improvement in the leverage ratio regulation.On this basis,the dissertation analyzes the incompatibility between the rigid leverage ratio regulation and the elastic capital adequacy ratio regulation in the current flexible capital regulation,and finds that the capital regulation model with flexible capital adequacy ratio regulation and rigid leverage ratio regulation exists.Mechanism defects are not conducive to the prevention of systemic risks.Furthermore,the paper proposes to introduce a leverage buffer to solve this defect,and defines the quantity and quality requirements and implementation methods of leverage buffers,and proposes a flexible leverage ratio monitoring program.The framework for flexible capital regulation has been supplemented.There is a common goal for flexible capital adequacy ratio regulation and rigid leverage ratio regulation,but there is still inconsistency between them.This shows that when researching various regulatory policy advances and methods,it should not be confined to regulatory policies on their own goals.The impact analysis,taking into account the complexity of the financial system and the cross correlation of various risks,also needs to analyze the cross-impact effects of various regulatory policies on each other's goals and identify potential inconsistencies.Therefore,it is necessary to incorporate flexible capital regulation within a broader scope of action to examine its impact on other potential risks of the banking system and to study the coordination between flexible capital regulation and other risk regulation or management.Based on the assumption of information asymmetry and the correlation model of capital and run risk,the paper analyzes the characteristics of bank run risk under the regulation of the minimum capital adequacy ratio and finds that flexible capital regulation can mitigate the run risk caused by information asymmetry and proves the coordination between regulation and micro-prudential risk management on the run.This research results to supplement the theoretical basis for the promotion of flexible capital regulation.Finally,the paper concludes with recommendations for promoting an flexible capital regulatory framework.It is believed that measures should be taken from several aspects such as improving the incentive compatibility of capital regulation,improving the use of capital regulation tools in infrastructure,enhancing the coordination of capital regulation,and alleviating the information asymmetry to promote the effective implementation of flexible capital regulation.