Study On Channel Strategy Of Green Product Supply Chains Under Uncertainties

As the environmental problem is more and more serious,green manufacturing has become an inevitable trend.All sectors of society have shown great concern about green product supply chains.Channel strategy of a green product supply chain plays an important role on performance of the whole supply chain and its members,consumers,and the environment.In order to further promote the development of green product supply chain,this paper investigates channel strategy of green product supply chains under fuzzy uncertainties of both consumer demands and production cost.This dissertation considers the internal factors of the green product supply chain,such as,channel leadership,corporate environmental responsibility,and the interaction between the channel members,etc.Besides,many external factors are also considered,such as,consumer environmental awareness,competition with traditional product supply chain,and government policy.The specific research contents and results are as follows.The second chapter establishes a game model of a green product supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,and further researches the effects of the governmental subsidy or punishment policies and channel leadership on the equilibrium results.By studying the supply chains of the manufacturer dominant,the retailer dominant,and the status symmetric of the manufacturer and the retailer,this chapter establishes the manufacturer Stackelberg,the retailer Stackelberg,and Vertical Nash game models,respectively.By comparisons and analyses of the equilibria of the three game models,the findings show that the manufacturer Stackelberg model is unfavorable for the supply chain,consumer,and the environment.When governmental intervention level is moderate,the Vertical Nash model is the best.However,when governmental intervention level is relatively high,the retailer Stackelberg model is the best for not only the supply chain,the consumer and the environment,but also the retailer itself and the manufacturer.In order to promote the development of green products,a relatively high adjustment factor or green level threshold are necessary for the government.When governmental intervention is relatively strong,because of the first-mover disadvantage,it is more advantageous for the manufacturer to be a follower than a leader.At the same time,when governmental intervention is relatively strong,only supply chain oriented by the retailer can receive governmental subsidy.Besides,governmental intervention is beneficial to the environmental protection and the retailer,but it is not always good for the supply chain and the manufacturer.Through the interactions between channel members,the retailer benefits from the governmental subsidy and further becomes the major pusher of the green product supply chain.When the uncertainties of parameters increase,manufacturer’s expected profit increases,while the change of the retailer’s expected profit is not obvious.The third chapter establishes a game model of a dual-channel green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer.The manufacturer produces green products and can sell them to consumers through two channel structures:single indirect channel or dual channels.The products sold by the two channels are substitutable.This chapter investigates whether the manufacturer should introduce an online channel on the basis of the existing retail channel.The findings show that when the marginal sales cost of the retail channel is relatively high,the manufacturer has an incentive to open an online channel.However,when green investment cost and the manufacturer’s environmental responsibility are relatively high,the manufacturer will prefer the single indirect channel.When consumer’s loyalty to the retail channel,the marginal sales cost of direct channel,and the green investment cost are relatively low,the retailer prefers to collaborate with the manufacturer to open a direct channel.In addition,green level plays a key role on channel strategy.When the green level is exogenous,the higher the green level,the more likely the manufacturer will adopt dual-channel strategy.When the green level is endogenous,a relatively higher green level will not only encourage the manufacturer to introduce the online channel,but also encourage the retailer to cooperate with the manufacturer to build dual-channel structure.Vice versa,dual-channel structure promotes the green level.However,due to expanding the consumer demand,dual channel strategy is not conducive to protect the environment.The fourth chapter studies the channel structure strategy of a green product supply chain under the competition with a traditional product supply chain.The chapter considers the impacts of the competition of the products,the cost structure,and the government policy on the equilibrium results.The findings show that when green level is exogenous,the Nash equilibrium is dependent on the level of competition between products.Specifically,centralization-centralization is always a Nash equilibrium regardless of the level of competition between products is high or low.However,when the level of competition between the products is relatively high,decentralization-decentralization is also the Nash equilibrium.However,the equilibria may not realize the optimal profit of the supply chains.That is,there exists the prisoner’s dilemma.Only when the competition between products is relatively high,the decentralization-decentralization can realize the optimal profit of the green supply chain.When green level is endogenous,the Nash equilibrium also depends on the marginal production cost.Specifically,when the marginal production cost is relatively small,decentralization-decentralization is a Nash equilibrium;when the marginal production cost is relatively large,centralization-decentralization is a Nash equilibrium.Although centralization-centralization is a Nash equilibrium,it is not always Pareto Optimality.When the marginal production cost is relatively small,decentralization-decentralization can realize Pareto Optimality.However,when the marginal production cost is relatively large,concentration-decentralization can realize Pareto Optimality for the green supply chain,but the traditional supply chain cannot realize Pareto optimal.For green level,when governmental intervention is relatively moderate,the equilibrium green level cannot realize the maximum green level.But when the governmental intervention is relatively high,it can achieve the optimum.Therefore,the governmental forceful intervention is necessary.The fifth chapter summarizes the research achievements and limitations of the dissertation,and further points out future research directions.