Research On Opportunistic Behaviors In The Management Of State-owned Enterprises Under The Principal-agent Relationship

In today's world,state-owned enterprises still play an indispensable role in achieving macro-control,making up for market failures,meeting social public demand and promoting the realization of social equity in China.Needless to say,state-owned enterprises are more important in China.However,due to the congenital defect caused by the widespread existence of the principal-agent relationship,the performance of state-owned enterprises is often equated with low efficiency and low income.Opportunism behavior in state-owned enterprises seriously affects the performance of enterprises,and has become a worldwide problem,which is particularly prominent in our country.Opportunism behavior has not only greatly affected the performance of state-owned enterprises,but also affected the state's ability to configure and supply public resources,and even endanger China's political environment and social atmosphere.The study of this problem in foreign countries is accompanied by the deepening of time.It has been explored from the efficiency to the organization,from the organization management to the content of the behavior,and so on.Orange taste different in different environment",and the same research will lead to different conclusions in different enviroments.Compared with other countries,the domestic academic research on the opportunism of state-owned enterprises,especially the mechanism of opportunistic behavior under the complex entrustment of state-owned enterprises,which is obviously insufficient.So whether it is from the require of theoretical development or from the reality of China,we need to lucubrate the opportunism behavior and governance issues of state-owned enterprises under the condition of the entrusted agency(contain complex situations).Full text thinking:This paper takes opportunistic behavior as the research object,and takes the business process under the complex principal-agent relationship as the environmental background,and defines the scope of the state-owned enterprises as the background.And on the basis of making clear the background and significance of the selected topic,combining the literature summary,it comb the core concepts and theories.Firstly,based on the theory this paper takes the opportunism performance of state-owned enterprises as the starting point,analyzes the common behavior of opportunistic behavior under the condition of principal agency in state owned enterprises and expounds the significance and value of the general performance and classification of opportunism behavior of the state-owned enterprise of our country.Secondly,it analyzes the general principles that lead to opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises,including core motivation,other factors,the special causes of opportunistic behavior under complex commissioned conditions,etc.Thirdly,it analyzes the influence of principal-agent environment on opportunistic behavior successively,including general effect(cost,income and efficiency),impact(environment,culture),etc.And it also sums up the harm of opportunistic behavior to state-owned enterprises.Then,the evolutionary game model is used to analyze and deduce the opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises in China,and the empirical analysis of the causes of opportunistic behavior in state-owned enterprises has been conducted.Finally,it explores how to manage the opportunism behavior of state-owned enterprises in China.Including:management system framework,the core mechanism of governance,application and setting of specific system,to explore how to reduce the probability of opportunistic behavior in complex principal-agent in state-owned enterprises through mechanism and system design.Each part of the paper is set as follows:First,this paper summarizes the domestic and foreign related opportunistic behavior and corporate governance of state-owned enterprises,the principal-agent theory and other related documents to define and clarify the "state-owned enterprises"and "opportunistic behavior" and "principal-agent relationship","complex principal-agent relationship" and "incentive and restraint mechanism" and other core concepts.Next,it simply reviews the relevant contract theory,principal-agent theory,corporate governance theory,public choice theory and incentive theory of the core content,and takes it as the theoretical basis of this paper.Second,starting with the form of opportunism behavior of state-owned enterprises,it summarizes and classifies the common opportunism behaviors of state-owned enterprises in our country.Then,through the classification of common opportunistic forms,the definition and summary of the general opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises in China are realized,which takes the opportunism behavior directly affects the interests of the parties,or directly affects the information between the parties as the standard to classify the opportunism behavior of the state-owned enterprises and clarify the social harmfulness in the subjective(subjective malignant),so as to pave the way for the subsequent treatment of opportunistic behavior selection and punishment system.Finally,as the biggest innovation and value of this study,the author analyses the reasons of the state-owned enterprise opportunism,including the core reason of the opportunism behavior,the general cause mechanism for the state-owned enterprises,as well as the special opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises which is formed by four kinds of complex principal-agent relations,such as multiple principal agency,collective principal-agent,long agency and multi task principal-agent and summarizes the special forms of opportunism in state-owned enterprises such as client opportunism(lazy staff,bureaucracy),grab the bonus system or system distortion and information filtering and information to loaf on the job or gain profit in risk.Third,it mainly analyzes the possible adverse effects of opportunistic behavior on firm performance,corporate governance,external environment and social climate under the principal-agent environment and comprehensively uses the theoretical analysis methods,case introduction methods and paves the way for further research on opportunistic behavior.Fourth,on the basis of deep analysis of the performance and impact of opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises under the aforementioned principal-agent conditions,this paper probes into the reasons for a great deal of opportunism behavior caused by the principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises.Fifth,it puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for the governance of opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises:It puts forward and analyzes how to use residual claim mechanism,salary distribution mechanism,market reputation mechanism and explicit and implicit incentive mechanism to play a governance role.It also puts forward the reasons for cutting opportunism,the way of blocking opportunistic behavior,the probability of inhibiting and reducing the occurrence of opportunistic behavior,effective encouragement of righteous gains,vigorously punishment of illegal gains,and establishment of corresponding concrete system,countermeasure and measure.This paper expects to make a systematic study of opportunism behavior in the principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises and discuss the characteristics,forms,mechanisms and paths of opportunistic behavior and analyze the core factors affecting the opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises.It expects to specifically put forward micro governance measures,meso governance system and macro governance system construction proposals according to the analysis results.