Research On “crowding-out Effect Of Compound Governance” In “an Agricultural Leading Enterprise With Peasant Households” Channel

Agricultural industrialization is an important mean for the government to effectively solve the problem of decentralized management of small farmers featuring small scale production,poor risk resistance and high transaction cost,and also an important way for scholars who research issues concerning agriculture,countryside,farmers to explore the road of modern agricultural development in China.In the process of rapid development of agricultural modernization in China,as an important form of agricultural production organization helping small-scale peasant households to achieve agricultural scale,"an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households" operating organizations driving more than a quarter of the peasant households have become the leading mode of agricultural industrialization.Relevant information and field research shows that "an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households" operating organizations have indeed played a significant role in promoting technological progress,ensuring the quality and safety of agricultural products and increasing farmers' income.However,in reality,default phenomenon that farmer re-choose traditional market transaction to replace formal contract transaction often occurs,which leads to the problem of poor channel stability and low performance in the development of "an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households".From the perspective of transaction governance theory,the compound governance(formal contract governace coexisting with traditional social norms governance)phenomenon objectively exists in the agricultural products trading market.The essence of farmers' default is to transform the formal contract trading governace with modern characteristics into traditional social trading governace,namely "crowding-out effect" of traditional social norms governance on formal contract governance in "an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households" channel compound governance,and the "crowding-out effect" contradicts the theoretical viewpoint that formal contract transaction governance is the only way for all economies to modernize.Therefore,based on the principal-agent theory,incomplete contract theory,transaction cost theory and relational governance theory,this study constructs the theoretical framework of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" formation mechanism,channel stability,transaction performance in "an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households" channel.This study uses the theoretical framework to reveal formation mechanism of "crowding-out effect of compound governance",explore the impact of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" on channel stability,and put forward major measures to avoid breach of formal contract.This study focuses on the above topics to carry out the following four aspects research:First of all,based on the above theoretical framework,from the perspective of transaction and relationship characteristics,this study establishes the influencing factors model of governance mechanism selection to reveal the formation mechanism of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" in "an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households" channel.Secondly,interaction model is used to analyze the relationship between "crowding-out effect of compound governance" and channel stability,transaction performance.In addition,the control measures to avoid the negative influence of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" are discussed in depth.Thirdly,from the perspective of formal contract function,the study compares the current situation of channel stability in different types of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" to test whether the relationship between "crowding-out effect of compound governance" and channel stability is affected by contract function;Finally,incorporating trust into the two-dimensional compound governance model with formal contract governance as the principal part,it explores the relation mechanism of formal contracts and relational governance on channel stability,and further explores the moderating role of favor in the relationship between governance mechanisms and channel stability to provide solutions for circumventing formal contract being breached.The results of this study are as follows:(1)Empirical research on the formation mechanism of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" in "an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households" channel shows that: compound governance(formal contract governace coexisting with traditional social norms governance)phenomenon objectively exists in the agricultural products trading market;Asset specificity and relationship risk have a significant positive impact on the continue to use formal contract governance,while market uncertainty has a significant negative impact on the continue to use formal contract governance;Asset specificity and relationship risk have a significant negative impact on traditional social norms governance,while market uncertainty has a significant positive impact on traditional social norms governance.Market forces have changed farmers' expectations,which leads to traditional social norms governance crowds out formal contract governance.In other words,market uncertainty is the main factor for the formation of "crowding-out effect of compound governance".(2)Research on the impact of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" on channel stability shows that: "crowding-out effect" of traditional social norms governance on formal contract governance has a significant negative impact on "an agricultural leading enterprise with peasant households" channel stability,which can reflect that "crowding-out effect of compound governance" undermines the stability of channel.Therefore,research results can effectively explain the default phenomenon observed by us;Farmers' legal awareness has a significant negative moderating role on the relationship between "crowding-out effect of compound governance" and channel stability;Channel stability has a direct contribution to improving transaction flexibility performance and trading sales performance.(3)Research on the impact of different types of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" on channel stability from the perspective of contractual function shows that: both contractual control function and coordination function have a significant positive impact on channel stability;The "crowding-out effect" of traditional social norms governance on contractual control function has a significant negative impact on channel stability,while the "crowding-out effect" of traditional social norms governance on contractual function has no significant positive impact on channel stability,which can reflect that only "crowding-out effect of compound governance" I undermines channel stability.Therefore,research results also effectively explain default phenomenon from contract perspective.(4)Research on the regulation mechanism of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" from the perspective of trust shows that: both formal contract governance and trust have a significant direct impact on channel stability,meanwhile combination of formal contract governance and trust has a significant positive effect on channel stability.Namely,contract governance and trust has a complementary relationship in improving channel stability;Favor has a significant positive moderating role on the relationship between "combination of formal contract governance and trust" and channel stability.The innovation and theoretical contribution of this study are mainly manifested in three aspects: 1)From the perspective of "crowding-out effect of compound governance",the essence of farmers' default of contract is effectively revealed,research perspective is innovative.From research results at home and abroad,related research mainly focuses on choice of channel governance mechanism.Even a few papers have researched the problem of compound governance,they only study substitution or complementarity relationship between formal contract and relationship governance,lacking of special research on the compound governance(formal contract governace coexisting with traditional social norms governance).Based on relevant channel governance theory,this study constructs theoretical framework of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" formation mechanism,channel stability,transaction performance,and uses the theoretical framework to effectively reveal practical problem of farmers' breach of contract from the external factors of formal contract(transaction and relationship characteristics)and the internal factor of formal contract(functional differences);2)The interaction model is used to empirically analyze the impact of "crowding-out effect of compound governance" on channel performance,analysis method is scientific.At present,case study method and experimental method are main research methods in domestic related literature.Considering that deductive empirical research which is on the spot survey through random sampling can not only verify and discover new theoretical viewpoints,but also be scientific,interaction model as an analytical tool for this study;3)This study discusses regulatory measures to avoid farmers' default from the perspective of trust,which is not only consistent with the current research trend,but also has a proper interpretation of the reality.And this study has a important practical value: It provides some useful suggestions for agricultural leading enterprises to establish stable cooperative relations with farmers,such as signing differentiated contracts based on transaction characteristics and relationship characteristics,moderately using contractual control function and attaching importance to coordination function,enhancing farmers' legal awareness,recognizing important role of favor and trust in trading relationships,combined using governance mechanisms based on transaction conditions;It has important reference significance for government departments to macro-control the trade relationship between agricultural leading enterprises and farmers,strengthen market supervision,encourage other organizations(farmers' professional cooperatives)to play an active role,and promote healthy development of agricultural industrialization.