Research On The Risk Conduction And Supervision Mechanism Of Going-concern Opinion:

The going concern hypothesis is one of the basic accounting assumptions.It refers to the fact that the audited entity,when preparing financial statements,assumes that its business activities will continue in the foreseeable future,and it does not plan to or need to terminate the operation or bankruptcy liquidation.Therefore,when the financial situation and operating results of the audited entity are seriously deteriorated or other events and circumstances that limit the ability of going concern occur,the auditor will issue going-concern opinions.With the change of accounting information from the measurement of historical cost to the measurement of historical cost and fair value,the requirements for the relevance of accounting information decision-making are also gradually improved.Going concern opinion,as the external auditor's evaluation of the enterprise's future business ability,also marks a significant change from the pure history-oriented auditing to the history-oriented and future-oriented auditing.In addition,auditing is the bridge of accounting information disclosure and external stakeholders.Auditing is the main tools of auditors disclosing the messages to the entire external stakeholder,and auditing standards require the auditor should be audit actively evaluating each customer's ability of going concern,and this additional requirement beyond the accuracy and completeness of the annual report disclosure on the company's professional evaluation.As one of the special non-standard opinions,whether there is particularity in the performance of audit function of going concern opinion is a core issue in our research.In 2018,the CSRC will vigorously push forward the revision of the securities law,and steadily push forward the delisting system reform of enterprises with operational difficulties to solve the current situation of delisting difficulty and motivation of shell protection,and promote the reform of the registration system to achieve the delisting normalization.In this context,we explain the relationship between auditors,investors,management and the external market environment in the context of going concern constraints by analyzing the risk transmission mechanism and supervision mechanism of GCO,as well as the linkage effect between them.According to the above analysis,this paper conducts empirical tests in the following three aspects:Firstly,combining with the impact of external market environment,we study the information content of the heterogeneity of GCO.The study found that:First,GCO delivered bad news to the market,which caused the stock price of the company to drop.Disclaimer of GCO is heterogeneous compared with other audit opinions,and the market cannot significantly identify going-concern unqualified opinions and going-concern reserved opinions.Second,the information transmission mechanism of GCO has hysteresis;Thirdly,State-owned property can significantly reduce the negative impact of GCO;Fourthly,The more transparent the market environment is,the more beneficial it will be for GCO's risk transmission mechanism to play,and the more beneficial for different types of GCO heterogeneous risk transmission mechanism to play.Secondly,based on the above research,we further explore the specific action path of the risk transmission mechanism of GCO.The findings are as follows:First,GCO will cause the change of investors' attitude to value assessment;Second,There is a path of action for the risk transmission mechanism of GCO,that is,GCO causes the market to attach importance to long-term assets and long-term liabilities,while less importance to the evaluation of net cash value,receivables and inventory,and the market pricing attaches importance to the balance sheet and ignores the income statement.Thirdly,GCO causes the market to underestimate the value of shell resources,and can be weakened by mergers and acquisitions.Meanwhile,the longer the GCO are issued,the more serious the negative effects brought by the risk transmission mechanism and the more serious impact on the value of shell resources.Thirdly,combining with the external market environment,the supervision mechanism of GCO is studied.Study found that:First,After GCO,the management using the earnings management operation to improve the profit is more intense,and control the accrued items,turning to use real earnings management in order to achieve rigged performance,save fame and position and reducing financing constraints;Second,The supervision mechanism of GCO is affected by the nature of property rights and the heterogeneity of GCO,and is time-limited;Thirdly,the occurrence of merger and acquisition events will lead to the change of the supervision mechanism of GCO,and the exertion of the supervision mechanism of GCO is limited.In a word,from the perspective of agency theory,the substantial failure of the supervision mechanism of GCO can be compensated by the play of the risk transmission mechanism of GCO from the perspective of information theory.Due to the short-term effect of the management's earnings management,and the results of earnings management are mainly reflected in the income statement,while the risk transmission mechanism of GCO makes investors pay more attention to the long-term assets and liabilities of the enterprise,attach importance to the information of the balance sheet,and pay little attention to the income statement.The opposition and unity of the two mechanisms is conducive to the allocation of resources in China's capital market and the protection of investors'interests,and is also the natural reflection of the continuous development and adjustment of going concern auditing under the special institutional background of China.The innovation and contribution are followed as:Firstly,based on the information theory of auditing,study GCO's heterogeneity market reaction and its risk conduction mechanism path,expanding to continue the existing research of GCO,and help to establish the system of supervision;Second,based on the agency theory of auditing,combined with China's weak efficient market environment analysis,research GCO's supervision mechanism,and at the same time considering nature of property rights,GCO's heterogeneity and merger,to explain the many problems of the current situation of the capital market in China;Third,starting from the perspective of the static and dynamic,research GCO's effectiveness of risk conduction mechanism and supervision mechanism,to provide decision basis for the business operators,help investors choose investment targets and protect their interests.