Study On The Influence Of Mixed Government Structure On Corporate Economic Performance And Social Responsibility In Chinese State-owned Enterprises

As an important pillar of China's national economy,state-owned enterprises(SOE)are the backbone of the state-owned economy,and their dual tasks of pursuing economic performance and social responsibility are obvious.This demand about the dual tasks has become an important background for the globally competitive development of SOE.At the same time,the introduction of mixed ownership reform has accelerated the transformation of SOE from administrative governance to economic governance.However,due to the heterogeneity of shareholders,the conflict of interest between social shareholders and state-owned shareholders occurs,resulting in the influence on corporate decision-making and task selection,even the intervention on the board of directors and top management team.In addition,the fundamental goal about deepening the reform of SOE is to establish a modern enterprise system.Although the reform has been going on for many years,the problem of“externalization of internal governance”still exists.Therefore,it is necessary to rationalize and arouse the relationship and effect of the internal governance structure in SOE such as shareholders,the board of directors and top manager team.In summary,based on the theoretical background of the multi-task heterogeneous principal agent structure of SOE,and combining the real situation of SOE's reform,our research starts with core institutions which includes the ownership structure,board structure and management structure,and analyzes the influence of the mixed internal governance structure on the dual tasks.Meanwhile,based on the research results,we propose policy recommendations for the development of SOE's reform.The main research contents,conclusions and innovations of this paper are as follows:First,based on the heterogeneity of shareholders,we clarify the characteristics of the dual-tasking effect of the state-owned shareholder structure,which consists of state-owned shareholders,foreign shareholders,institutional shareholders and individual shareholders.We found that state-owned shareholders can basically balance the pursuit of corporate social responsibility and economic performance with the identity of the government spokespersons.Foreign shareholders can enhance corporate social responsibility by their virtue of standardized management concepts,but the particularity about the interest pursuit is still existence,which results in a short-term loss of economic performance.The characteristics about the profit-seeking of institutional shareholders and senior shareholders are relatively more prominent,showing an emphasis on economic performance and exclusion of social responsibility.The increase of the mixed ownership degree will mainly weaken the effect of state-owned shareholders.The conclusion of our research not only clarifies the direct influence about four types of heterogeneous shareholders on the dual tasks,but also identifies the effect changes and deviations of each shareholder under the effect of mixed-equity structure.Second,the special experience and background of the directors in SOE examines the influence of directors' social network resources on the dual tasks from the perspective of resources.On the other hand,it judges the different functional preferences of the board of directors in the relationship between heterogeneous shareholders and dual tasks.The study found that the social network of government official directors focuses on the impact of social responsibility,while the social network of entrepreneurial directors purely promotes the improvement of corporate economic performance.The operational decision function preference of the board of directors acts more than the supervision management function preference in the mediation effect.The conclusion of the study combines the high-order theory,the socialization theory and the status of SOE,and clarifies the preference of directors' resources and functional characteristics under the mixed structure for corporate tasks and decision-making,further provides the idea about the selection and appointment of the directors.Third,we further explore the characteristics of the management structure,and analyze the role of the top management team with different business function types on the dual tasks.At the same time,we start from the economic incentives and the non-economic incentives,comprehensively judge the effect of the incentives for executives.The study found that the production technology executive team only pays attention to the economic performance,while the management service executive team can promote the dual task implementation more comprehensively.The executives' tenure and reputation incentive work mainly on the corporate social responsibility,while the executive compensation and on-the-job consumption only focus on the realization of economic performance.The conclusions not only give the basis for the arrangement of the top management team from the perspective of business function,but also give a plan to rationally select the executive incentives according to the company's mission preferences.Fourth,in view of the actual demands of the classification reform of SOE,and for the robustness of the conclusions,we reconfirm the main research contents in the two sub-samples,found that the basic conclusion is the same with that in main sample,but:compared with commercial competition SOE,the role of internal corporate governance structure focuses more on promoting the improvement of corporate social responsibility due to stronger government control and more pure corporate mission requirements in special function SOE.The conclusion further affirmed the necessary about the classification reform during the process of SOE's reform.