| Financing difficulties,financing problem is important factor in the development of small micro enterprises,network of borrowing(hereinafter referred to as the net credit)using the Internet technology of data mining,information dissemination and sharing resources,can effectively ease the "information asymmetry" and "transaction costs" problem,which has become one of the important way of small micro enterprise financing.On the basis of sorting out the relevant theories and existing research results of online loan for small and micro enterprises,this paper attempts to take credit rating and penalty cost as the entry point,study the way to break through the traditional financing dilemma with the help of online loan for small and micro enterprises,so as to control credit risk and alleviate the financing difficulty for small and micro enterprises.In this paper,starting from the actual situation,the plight of traditional financing of small and micro enterprises is investigated,as well as the reality that online lending of small and micro enterprises defuses the traditional financing dilemma.The paper also tries to analyze the inevitability of the evolutionary game analysis model and equilibrium analysis model of online loan for small and micro enterprises through theoretical logic.To clinch a deal with Britain's five major P2 P platform has the small micro enterprise loan transaction data,and the home of net credit ratings are obtained and participate in lending to small micro enterprise credit platform of 50,using Probit and OLS model,to the empirical test of the conclusion of theoretical analysis,and use the Logit,TSLS,Stepwise,robustness test Quantreg model,further investigate the credit rating and punishment mechanism of small micro enterprise loan transaction cost.Then,it further analyzes the problems of risk control and international experience of online loan for small and micro enterprises under the constraint of credit rating and penalty cost.Finally,put forward the corresponding policy recommendations.The thesis is as follows:First,the credit rating and punishment cost are introduced into the design of online loan mechanism to analyze the evolutionary game between financial institutions and small and micro enterprises.It is found that credit rating and penalty cost mechanism can reduce the proportion of high-risk enterprises applying for online loans,promote the successful enterprises of online loans to fulfill their debt and interest payment obligations,and increase the proportion of small and micro enterprises abiding by moral standards in economic activities.In order to overcome the information asymmetry problem,when the cost of concealment is higher than the normal repayment of principal and interest,the enterprise will pay the principal and interest normally,and the default rate of online loan will be reduced.The verification of financial institutions can also reduce the concealment rate of enterprises.The verification probability is directly proportional to the loan size and loan interest rate,and inversely proportional to the assets liquidation cost and credit cost of enterprises.On the whole,through credit rating and punishment cost,financial institutions can design the network lending mechanism,which can improve the proportion of small and micro enterprises that abide by moral standards in economic activities,increase the willingness of financial institutions to lend money to small and micro enterprises,reduce the default rate of online loans,and help to control the transaction risk of online lenders.Second,in order to further analysis net lending financial market equilibrium condition,according to the basic principle of supply and demand model,will be born in credit rating and punishment cost model,builds a credit review on loan interest rate,financial institutions lending costs,enterprise assets liquidation costs and the cost of credit small micro enterprise loan balance analysis model.Theoretical analysis shows that financial institutions examine and constrain online loan contracts by establishing credit rating and penalty cost for small and micro enterprises.Small and micro enterprises choose online loan contracts based on their own credit rating and punishment cost they can bear,and both borrowing and lending parties achieve equilibrium under the market supply and demand conditions.Third,with the help of the transaction data of small and micro businesses that have successfully obtained loans from five major P2 P platforms in the UK,the impact of credit rating and punishment cost of small and micro businesses on online lending transactions is empirically tested.The empirical test results are as follows: first,the credit rating is positively correlated with the loan recovery rate of small and micro enterprises,that is,the credit rating can effectively highlight the credit level of small and micro enterprises,and can promote the success rate of online loan transaction of small and micro enterprises.The second is to test the robustness by using the dummy variable of credit rating.This is because of the large proportion of enterprises with high credit rating among such enterprises with high loan interest rate.Therefore,this also indicates that credit rating is positively correlated with capital recovery rate.Third,the coefficient of interest rate is negative,and the rate of capital recovery is negative.According to the original hypothesis of this paper,it can be concluded that the penalty cost has a positive effect on the recovery rate of funds and has a promoting effect on the success rate of online loan transaction of small and micro enterprises.Fourthly,under the credit rating and punishment cost mechanism of small and micro enterprises,the online lending platform can select projects with less risk,so as to effectively control the risks of online lending transactions at the source.Fourth,taking the 50 online lending platforms that have obtained the rating of China's online lenders and participated in the lending of small and micro businesses as samples,the impact of credit rating and punishment cost of online lending platforms on the online lending transactions of small and micro businesses is empirically tested.The empirical test results are as follows:first,the credit rating of the online lending platform has a positive impact on the success rate of online lending transactions of small and micro enterprises.The penalty cost of online loan platform default has a positive impact on the success rate of online loan transaction of small and micro enterprises.That is to say,the credit rating and punishment cost mechanism of China's online lending platforms can promote the success rate of online lending transactions of small and micro enterprises.Secondly,the coefficients of technical points,liquidity points and transparency points are all positive,which has a positive impact on the platform volume and is positively correlated with the success rate of online loan transactions of small and micro enterprises.That is,the stronger the technical strength of the online lending platform,the shorter the payback period of investment funds,and the more information such as operational data and borrowing data published to the outside world,the higher the credit rating of the platform,the higher the transaction volume,and the greater the success rate of the online lending transactions of small and micro enterprises.Third,the coefficient of leverage integral is negative,which has a negative impact on the trading volume of the platform and is negatively correlated with the success rate of online loan transactions of small and micro enterprises.That is,the smaller the fund leverage of the online lending platform,the lower the credit rating of the platform,the lower the trading volume,and the smaller the success rate of the online lending transactions of small and micro enterprises.Fourthly,the combination of technical points,transparency points and brand points as punishment cost indicators in the credit rating index of online lending platforms has a positive impact on the trading volume of the platform and promotes the success rate of online lending transactions of small and micro enterprises.Fifth,the risk management and control system of small and micro-sized enterprises online loans was constructed according to the credit rating and punishment mechanism.One is to control the risk of credit rating with the help of big data technology,refine the data of credit rating,monitor the level of credit rating in real time and process the credit rating procedures.The second is to legalize the punishment cost by making laws and regulations in advance,and use the third-party platform to limit the default behavior to exert the punishment cost effect.Third,the internal risk of online lending enterprises is controlled by strengthening technical training in credit rating and punishment mechanism,innovating enterprise online lending information system,increasing technical safety control of online lending,and improving internal risk management organization structure of online lending enterprises.Fourth,when designing the ADR mechanism of China's online loan industry,we should take into account the four aspects of the internal dispute settlement mechanism of online loan enterprises,the internal dispute settlement mechanism of online loan industry,the dispute settlement mechanism of Chinese regulatory authorities,arbitration and litigation settlement mechanism.At the same time,attention should be paid to realizing the legalization of ADR mechanism,creating a favorable social environment,establishing the concept of diversified dispute settlement methods for online lending,strengthening supervision and management,highlighting the protection of investors,and promoting the ADR mechanism of online lending industry through pilot projects.The innovation points of this paper mainly include:First,a new theoretical model of online lending is established.An initial attempt is made to analyze the online loan problem of small and micro enterprises by building an evolutionary game analysis model and incorporating credit rating and penalty cost into the endogenous mechanism,so as to analyze the influence of these two variables on the credit level of the entire credit market on the online loan problem of small and micro enterprises.In addition,credit rating and penalty cost were added into the original equilibrium analysis model of online loan for small and micro enterprises to analyze the loan decisions of both lenders and borrowers from a micro perspective,so that both lenders and borrowers could achieve equilibrium under market supply and demand conditions.Theory model of the small micro enterprise long-term accumulated credit capital promoted to a very important form of capital,as an enterprise for the future development of its capital into endogenous mechanism,enrich the theory of small micro enterprise loan related,for our country traditional financial institutions to solve the financing dilemma,the exploration of innovative small micro enterprise loan to provide theoretical support.Second,it finds that credit rating and punishment cost mechanism can promote the success rate of online lending.Through the establishment of credit rating and punishment cost for small and micro enterprises and online lending platforms,the empirical analysis from two different perspectives shows that credit rating and punishment cost mechanism can promote the success rate of online lending transactions for small and micro enterprises.Third,the path of credit rating and punishment cost mechanism is planned.Aiming at the traditional financing difficulties,this paper puts forward a path that financial institutions can use credit rating and penalty cost to design online lending mechanism to control credit risks and alleviate financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises.Fourth,under the constraint of credit rating and penalty cost,the ADR mechanism of China's online loan industry is designed.This paper discusses the policy mechanism,analyzes the development stage,design ideas and operation structure of ADR mechanism in China's online loan industry,and puts forward relevant guarantee mechanism.These studies have certain promotion effect on solving the traditional financing dilemma. |
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