Research On Allocation Of Control Rights,Managerial Entrenchment And Refinancing Mode Selection Of Listed Companies In Gem

As the dynamic mechanism and survival basis of corporate implicit development and extended growth,refinancing is more important to the rapid development of GEM listed companies.However,while the scale and number of targeted additional issues in GEM have repeatedly reached new highs,the performance of companies has not improved synchronously,and the alienation of refinancing behavior has become prominent,resulting in serious structural contradictions and systemic risks.Tracing back to the source,the tunneling of the ultimate shareholders and the self-interest of the managers make the company choose the inappropriate financing method away from the actual situation,which is the result of the lack of rationality of the allocation of control rights in the context of complex network relations.However,how to calibrate and measure the allocation of corporate control rights in the complex situation,especially the overall measurement of the allocation of ultimate shareholder control among the three levels of authority in GEM listed companies is still a short board of empirical research,which is also the crux of the current research on the causes of refinancing alienation.Therefore,if we want to improve the efficiency of enterprise refinancing decision in the era of speed economy,and clarify the game problem of two kinds of agents at the theoretical level,it is necessary to restore the complex interest relationship in the process of refinancing decision and incorporate it into the calibration and measurement of the allocation of corporate control rights in order to trace back to the source of the above chaos.On this basis,the main problems of this study are as follows:?how to measure corporate control allocation under dual control chain;How does the allocation of control rights of the three levels of authority combine organically??whether there are differences in the choice of refinancing methods between companies with different allocation of control rights,What is the difference??how does the manager managerial entrenchment reflect in the choice of refinancing mode??what is the mechanism of the indirect influence of the allocation of control rights on the choice of the refinancing mode,and what role does the manager managerial entrenchment play?In the deconstruction of the above problems,this study reveals the incentive and constraint functions of the allocation of control rights and the corresponding agency conflicts of listed companies in the gem from the incomplete contract theory.Then,this study takes the manager managerial entrenchment into the research framework of the influence of control allocation on the choice of refinancing mode,analyzing the path from the manager managerial entrenchment to the refinancing behavior and using the method of stepwise regression analysis to explore the mechanism and transmission mechanism of the influence of control allocation on the choice of refinancing mode.In this paper,we focus on exploring the antecedents of refinancing decision from corporate governance as a whole rather than on a single element,so as to expand the research ideas of refinancing decision and improve the theoretical system of control allocation and corporate financial decision,as well as providing practical guidance on corporate governance and investment and financing for enterprises,investors and governments.The results show that:the higher the ultimate control allocation index,the more inclined the company is to choose convertible bonds,followed by corporate bonds;the lower the ultimate control allocation index,the more inclined the company is to choose private placement.The allocation of ultimate control has negative influence on the manager managerial entrenchment;The higher the manager managerial entrenchment,the more inclined the company is to choose private placement,but it is not sensitive to the choice between convertible bonds and bond financing.In addition,manager managerial entrenchment has partial intermediary effect in the relationship between ultimate control allocation and refinancing mode selection.Further study shows that the reason of partial intermediary effect is that the tunneling of the ultimate shareholders have an impact on the refinancing decision.Not only that,political connections and financial risks also have an impact on the choice of refinancing methods.The main work and innovative results of this study are as follows:First,on the basis of analyzing the allocation system of ultimate shareholder control,we construct the control allocation index of gem listed companies.Corporate governance as a whole requires the organic integration of the typical characteristic variables of the three levels of power institutions and the identification of the sources and solutions of the two types of agency problems within the company.For this reason,this study combines the management mode of corporate empowerment and takes the realization path of ultimate shareholder power as the starting point,clarifying the rent-seeking behavior and the power balance mechanism within the company.On this basis,this study selects“control degree",“separation degree"and"balance degree"in the general meeting of shareholders,the board of directors and the management level to reflect the internal governance efficiency of the company.At the same time,we select the index according to the equity control chain and the social capital control chain,constructing the control rights allocation index of listed companies in gem by using the appropriate statistical method,which can make up for the insufficient evaluation of the current research on the allocation of control rights,and lay a foundation for the further study of corporate governance.Secondly,it reveals the influence mechanism of control allocation on the choice of refinancing mode,and this study also attempts to find the disturbing factors of the choice of refinancing mode for gem listed companies from both internal and external aspects.As the root of the alienation of corporate refinancing behavior,the control rights allocation and the choice of refinancing mode are not only a simple binary relationship,but also can not be explained by the single element of corporate governance.To solve this problem,this study selects the behavior motivation of the proponent of the refinancing motion as the intermediate conduction factor according to the characteristics of the overall evaluation of the control rights allocation and the refinancing decision-making process,which studies the transmission mechanism between the control rights allocation,the manager managerial entrenchment and the refinancing mode according to the control allocation index.Besides,this study examines the disturbing influence of political association and financial risk on the allocation of control rights and the choice of refinancing mode,which has an impact on the search for the choice of refinancing mode.It is not only a further improvement to the research paradigm of refinancing preference,but also an important embodiment of the application of control allocation index,and It is of great significance to protect small and medium investors.Thirdly,manager managerial entrenchment is regarded as the explanation of the cause of financing preference,the essence of which is to expose the self-interest behavior of managers under the tunneling of controlling shareholders more obviously.Moreover,in the demonstration of intermediary effect,this study further examines the intermediary effect of shareholders'tunneling according to the characteristics of different financing methods,which reveals the main contradiction within the company.Compared with the existing research,this study brings the two kinds of agency problems into the same research framework,which makes the research more rich and perfect and persuasive.Its purpose is to inspire the company to strengthen the supervision and incentive of managers to solve or weaken the internal agency problem.In a word,the influence of the ultimate control rights allocation and the two kinds of agency problems on the choice of refinancing mode in the context of complex network relationship needs to be Rethinking.On the basis of dual control chain,this study focuses on the new calculation of the overall evaluation of the ultimate control right allocation,exploring the transmission mechanism of the refinancing mode selection through the manager management defense,which provides a new understanding for the refinancing alienation behavior from the root.It also reveals the dynamic correlation of the two kinds of agency problems,which provides the target basis for the optimal design of corporate control rights allocation.At the same time,it reveals the dynamic correlation of the two kinds of agency problems,and provides the target basis for the optimal design of corporate control rights allocation.