| Risk-taking can be traced back to the entrepreneurial spirit of adventure.In this paper,the risk-taking refers to the investment willingness of the enterprise,reflecting the choice of the venture investment project.Under the perfect market conditions,if the investment projects faced by the enterprise are arranged according to the expected net present value,the enterprise will place the critical option at the expected net present value equal to 0,that is,the enterprise will not give up any profitable projects.However,in the actual business operation,the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the operator is often accompanied by a more serious agency problem.The inconsistency between the owner and the operator's target income function often makes the enterprise's investment and financing decision deviate from the enterprise value maximization goal.The level of corporate governance is also different,resulting in differences in the level of risk-taking between enterprises.Risk-taking has a positive impact on the development of enterprises and the whole society.Because high-risk projects tend to have higher return on investment than low-risk projects,they contribute to the accumulation of corporate capital,thus promoting investment in science and technology research.Some studies have shown that enterprises are chasing Taking risks and taking risks is the driving force and source of enterprise and even social development.This paper explores the governance effects of different board characteristics and the impact on corporate performance from the perspective of risk-taking,which is helpful to reveal the positive impact of the board of directors on corporate investment and financing decisions in corporate governance,thus enriching the relevant research on board governance.Under the modern enterprise system of separation of powers,there is a common problem of the first type of agency between owners and operators.In addition,due to China's,unique corporate development background,it is not uncommon for large shareholder holdings.In the case that small shareholders are unable to participate in the daily business decisions of the company,the major shareholders have the motive to encroach on the rights and interests of the minority shareholders,so there is still a big The second type of agency problem between shareholders and minority shareholders.Two types of agency problems will make the enterprise's investment and financing decisions deviate from the goal of maximizing corporate interests.The board of directors is an important institutional arrangement to alleviate the agency problem of the company.The premise of the board of directors is that it has independence.Therefore,the board characteristics related to the independence of the board of directors are important issues in the research field,and the independent director system is the core.However,in the past research,it was more inclined to study the supervision and resource acquisition functions of independent directors.In fact,the professional background of independent directors also allows consulting functions to provide advice and suggestions for corporate investment and financing decisions.Therefore,this paper first examines the impact of board characteristics on corporate risk exposure.The ultimate goal of board governance must be to improve the business performance of the company.Therefore,this paper analyzes in detail the relationship between risk taking and business performance and the relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance.Furthermore,the characteristics of the board of directors may affect the business performance of the company by affecting the risk exposure of the enterprise.For this reason,we have established a mediation effect model based on risk taking to test the relationship among the three.It provided evidence for the positive role played by the board of directors in the company's investment and financing decisions and enriched relevant research.Different from the development of enterprises in Western countries,the establishment of China's modern enterprise system is rooted in China's special national conditions.The board system and the independent director system are all formed from the top down under the drive of administrative power.In 2001,the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "Guiding Opinions on Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Companies," which initiated the reform of independent directors.The "Notice on the Establishment and Improvement of the Pilot Work of the Board of Directors of State-owned Enterprises" by the State Council issued in 2004 opened the pilot reform of the board of directors of central enterprises.We used two reforms as exogenous events to examine the impact of the independent director system and the pilot reform of the board of directors on corporate risk exposure and corporate performance.On the one hand,the test results are conducive to clarifying the controversy over the effects of the two reforms;on the other hand,the conclusions of this paper are supported from the perspective of event research,making the results more stable.This paper mainly has the following four conclusions:(1)Characteristics of the board of directors and corporate risk exposure.1.There is no significant relationship between the size of the board of directors and risk taking;2.The proportion of independent directors is significantly positively related to the risk exposure of the enterprise;3.The establishment of the strategy committee is conducive to enhancing the risk exposure of the enterprise;4.The degree of the two positions of the chairman Significantly negatively correlated with risk exposure;5.The function of independent directors is significantly positively correlated with corporate risk exposure.According to the nature of ownership,the total sample is divided into two sub-samples of the state-owned enterprise group and the private enterprise group,and they are returned separately.It was found that the size of the board of directors was significantly negative in the state-owned enterprise group,but not significant in the private enterprise group.The proportion of independent directors is significantly positive in the state-owned enterprise group,but not significant in the private enterprise group.The degree of duality of work is not significant in the state-owned enterprise group,but it is significantly negative in the private enterprise group.The setting of the strategy committee is significant in both the private enterprise group and the state-owned enterprise group.(2)There is an inverted U-type relationship between corporate risk taking and corporate performance.That is,when the company increases the risk-bearing at the beginning of the period,it will significantly increase the performance of the company,but when it reaches a certain level,too much risk-taking will become a burden on the enterprise and reduce the performance of the enterprise.Further through the model analysis of internal incentives,it is tested whether the nature of ownership and the degree of marketization have different effects on the role of risk-taking.The empirical results show that private enterprises have higher risk-taking levels.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the higher risk-taking level of private enterprises enhances corporate performance,which means that economic development requires investment risk projects.However,in areas with a high degree of marketization,the difference in performance is diminished.(3)The relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance.When directly examining the relationship between the two,it was found that only the independent director function was significantly positively correlated with corporate performance after considering endogeneity issues.Considering the function of independent directors,it is possible to enhance the performance of the company by enhancing risk exposure.To this end,we have established a mediation effect model.The results show that the function of independent directors enhances corporate performance by improving the level of corporate risk tolerance.It shows that in order to better play the role of independent directors,in addition to ensuring independence,independent directors need to have the corresponding capabilities.Further,the total sample is divided into state-owned enterprises and private enterprises according to the nature of the ultimate controller.Re-examine the governance effects of board characteristics.It is found that the proportion of independent directors in the state-owned enterprise group significantly affects the performance of the enterprise,and in the corresponding mediation effect model,it is found that the risk-bearing plays a mediating effect between the proportion of independent directors and the performance of the enterprise.However,the proportion of independent directors in the private enterprise group does not have a significant impact on corporate performance.Taking the reform of China's independent director system as an exogenous event,the double-difference method was used to test that the introduction of independent directors is conducive to improving the risk-taking level of enterprises.(4)The policy effect of the pilot reform of the board of directors.Taking the pilot reform of the board of directors as an exogenous event,the double-difference model was used to examine the impact of the pilot reform of the board of directors on corporate risk-taking and corporate performance.The empirical results show that the pilot reform of the board of directors significantly improved the risk-taking and operational performance of the pilot enterprises.It shows that the pilot reform of the board of directors has improved corporate governance and improved the degree of scientific decision-making of enterprises.And this effect is more obvious in enterprises with a relatively low shareholding ratio of major shareholders.The setting up of special committees is another important part of the pilot reform of the board of directors.The role of the strategy committee was tested by the triple difference method.It was found that the setting up of the strategy committee promoted the improvement of the risk exposure of the company through the pilot reform of the board of directors.These findings,on the other hand,indicate that board governance also has significant advisory functions,which may be a contribution to existing research.The innovations in this article are as follows:(1)Enrich the research on the relationship between risk taking and corporate performance.Previous studies on the relationship between risk-taking and firm performance have yielded linearly relevant conclusions.Our research shows that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the two,and further through the internal incentive mechanism model,it is found that the nature of ownership and the degree of marketization have a significant impact on the relationship between the two.(2)Reveal the transmission path of "board characteristics-risk commitment-enterprise performance".The research in this paper provides support for the advisory function of the board of directors.It shows that the board of directors has a positive impact on corporate investment and financing decisions.It is found that the characteristics of the board of directors affect the performance of the company by affecting the level of risk-taking of the company,and further reveal the influencing factors that affect the business performance of the company.(3)The effect of the pilot reform of the board of directors is controversial.We use the method of event research to test the effectiveness of the pilot reform of the board of directors,which is conducive to clarifying relevant disputes. |
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