| Policy-oriented premium subsidies for agricultural insurance,as one of the few "green box policies" permitted by WTO,has become an important policy tool to stabilize agricultural production and improve farmers' welfare.Since 2007,China has also significantly strengthened its policy support for agricultural insurance and then the scales involving the number of farmers' insurance participation,government premium subsidies as well as the amount of agricultural insurance compensation have rapidly expanded,which is considered as the basis to become the important part of China's strategy supporting agriculture,country and farmer.However,on the one hand,government attaches great importance to agricultural insurance development and issues increasing policies and promotes the subsidies.On the other hand,realistic contradictions such as farmers'insufficient effective demand and insurance companies operate inertia contribute to the urging of "weak equilibrium".Therefore,this paper analyzes weak equilibrium involving three aspects such as "what,why and how" according to mathematical logic and puts forward strategy optimization suggestions for China's policy-oriented agricultural insurance framework development on the basis of weak equilibrium deciphering.First of all,theory frame of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is constructed on the mathematical verification of existing agriculture insurance market failure and necessity of government's subsidies tools application.Furthermore,dual characteristics of Chinese policy-oriented agricultural insurance including weak market scale and weak equilibrium state are described on the basis of China's policy-oriented agricultural insurance practice process and the concept of weak equilibrium is used to describe China's policy-oriented agricultural insurance.In this paper,weak equilibrium refers to smaller scale of agricultural insurance market and moderate inert breakthrough in size as well as path scale breakthrough,that is to say,weak market scale and weak equilibrium maintenance.Based on this,the existence of weak equilibrium is demonstrated by combining the typical characteristics and representations of the agricultural insurance market based on practical observation.Meanwhile,this paper,based on the hypothesis of participants'bounded rationality and game model of three main bodies'participation evolutionary,analyzes the influence of government's subsidies change and insurance company's premium set strategy adjustment on the formation of stable strategy involving farmers' insurance participation and insurance company's insurance acceptance.It is because government's subsidies in the agricultural insurance market signals a significant demonstration effect that two main bodies including farmers and insurance company are lack of power and will to break the equilibrium and expand the market in the absence of government's subsidies under the new agricultural insurance system,which well explains weak state characteristics of agricultural insurance market in China and the reasons for the state maintenance,which is considered as the path to explore weak equilibrium policy support system in the later content.Next,this paper analyzes the reasons for the farmers' insurance participation inertia and the influence mechanism.Firstly,the influencing factors model of farmers' willingness of insurance participation is constructed.It is concluded that farmers' risk perception level,government premium subsidies degree,the education level of rural labor force,farmers'income structure and alternative income channels measured by the migrant work,which significantly affect farmers'willingness of insurance participation.At the same time,Chinese farmers are characterized by following blindly,and the main driving force of famers' participation is based on experience observation rather than risk expectation management.Based on the regional differentiation of insurance participation rate,the model to explain farmers' insurance participation inertia in weak equilibrium is built,and weak equilibrium is explained from the perspective of alternative income channels and planting structure.The conclusions indicate that planting structure,alternative income channels and difference in the government's implicit regulation strength of agricultural insurance in different regions can fully explain heterogeneity of farmers' insurance participation rate in eastern,central and western regions of China.The high insurance participation rate is the result of high proportion of crops such as grain,cotton,oil and sugar in the planting structure,strong implicit regulation and restriction of the government in insurance participation as well as the lack of alternative income channels.However,high participation rate results from farmers' passive and irrational choice.The positive benefit attribute of China' s policy-oriented agricultural insurance participation and high government subsidy intensity cannot encourage the farmers in the central and western regions.However,farmers' participation incentive in eastern regions and urban economies mainly comes from the risk and return level of agricultural insurance participation,premium level,government subsidy ratio and post-disaster compensation level,which are the key variables of insurance participation decision-making.Policy-oriented agricultural insurance product system with the characteristic of "low premium,low compensation and low income cannot meet farmers' risk guarantee demand,which leads to the low participation rate among farmers in agricultural insurance in eastern regions and urban economies.Next,this paper analyzes the insurance company's operation inert,and the existence of inert is verified based on three perspectives including systemic risk scattering,dilution of agriculture insurance profit rate and political dividends as well as marginal cost changes of product innovation.Based on this,two-way DEA model is used to further measure and analyze agricultural insurance operation efficiency of different insurance companies.The conclusions show that high agricultural insurance innovation cost and high moral hazard possibility obstacles are not the decisive factors resulting in that the agricultural insurance product supply willingness of insurance companies is not strong.Realistic path of agricultural insurance innovation also exists,which is explained based on high efficiency performance of professional insurance companies,that is to say,effective product design,integration of farmers' insurance demand,emphasis of market-oriented risk management mechanism are feasible under the government's low-subsidy mode.Based on the consideration of efficiency influence mechanism simulation,agricultural insurance operating efficiency of insurance companies is measured from the dimension of region and panel model is constructed to experimentally test the decisive factors of efficiency.The conclusion shows that insurance companies are faced with operating difficulties such as low premium income,high compensation probability and huge compensation pressure in plating insurance operation.This is an important reason for insurance companies to show operational inertia in agricultural insurance,although government subsidies can correct this marketability distortion to some extent,Finally,participants' inert inhibit path is refined based on the lessons drawn from other countries in policy-oriented agricultural insurance development practice and combining with the inherent law of weak equilibrium characteristics of agricultural insurance.It is suggested that inert curb in allusion to government subject should focus on the clarity of policy-oriented agricultural insurance boundary,and for the farmers,inertia inhibit path focuses on ascension of risk guarantee degree,and insurance company should focus on how to construct subsidy system for insurance companies operating cost so as to suppress the inertia.In the end of this article,concrete policy optimization ideas of cracking weak equilibrium and realization of scale breakthrough are put forward from the perspective of agricultural insurance policy system perfection,including clearing policy-related agricultural insurance subsidies boundary from the top,speeding up of agricultural insurance upgrading reform,performing insurance companies operating expenses subsidies in new agricultural insurance business to improve risk guarantee and building government-led reinsurance system rather than collaborative system.The innovations of this paper are as follows:(1)explaining the reasons of weak equilibrium formation based on the characteristics definition of weak equilibrium of agricultural insurance and from the perspective of strategic game and participants interests;(2)providing an empirical approach to analyze and understand farmers' insurance participation inertia from the perspective of regional differentiation and based on counterfactual framework of intervention-control;(3)analyzing and empirically testing the influencing mechanism of insurance companies inertia with regional differences in operational efficiency of agricultural insurance as the realistic reflection. |
PDF Full Text Request