Research On The Reputation Mechanism Of P2P Network Lending Business

On the one hand,P2 P online lending alleviates the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises,and on the other hand,expands the financing channels for investors and promotes the development of inclusive finance in China.Since the establishment of paipaidai,the first P2 P platform in China,P2 P online lending industry has been developing rapidly.According to statistics,the largest number of platforms reached 3,464 in 2015,and the largest turnover reached 2,804.8 billion yuan in 2017.Compared with traditional financial institutions,P2 P online lending has the characteristics of no collateral,small amount of borrowing and simple lending procedures,reducing transaction costs and improving transaction efficiency.However,in June 2018,the "mine explosion" event that affected the whole industry broke out.In 2018,the number of closed platforms was 1,279,involving an amount of up to 143.41 billion yuan,involving 1.578 million investors,causing extremely serious social impact and harming the development of the entire P2 P online lending industry.Previous literature research on P2 P lending more attention to the supervision policy,investor behavior research,analysis of thunder "in the event of literature is less,and mostly from the perspective of macro environment,few scholars from the perspective of the reputation mechanism," ray ",related data evidence is very scarce,this paper tries to make up for the inadequacy of related aspects.Reputation mechanism in this paper,based on the important role of the P2 P loans,observed the P2 P lending explosion " thunder " incident,reputation mechanism is put forward and the failure may be the cause of thunder " in the event,then USES the data confirm that reputation mechanism failure,and combining the bilateral market properties of P2 P reputation mechanism and credit intermediary nature analysis and failure reasons,finally put forward relevant policy Suggestions.The core conclusions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,the data of hongling venture capital P2 P online lending platform are used to empirically verify that P2 P online lending has bilateral market attributes,which provides a prerequisite for analyzing the weakening effect of bilateral market attributes on reputation mechanism.Specifically,the impact of the cross-network externalities and self-network externalities between borrower and investor on borrower's utility and investor's utility.The influence of the number of borrowers,the number of investors,the management rate of borrowers and the investor service rate on the profits of P2 P online lending platforms.Research results show that: first,when to return to day,lending both sides there are cross network externalities and the network externalities,borrowing the P2 P network platform margins,the number of borrowers,the number of investors are proportional to the profit,borrowers were not associated with management fees and profits,investors service rates and profits into nonlinear positive correlation.Second,when the regression is carried out on a weekly basis,both the borrower and lender have positive crossover network externalities and self-network externalities,which have the same results before.The results are different in terms of profits of P2 P lending platforms.The number of borrowers is negatively correlated with profit,the number of investors is positively correlated with profit,the management rate of borrowers is not correlated with profit,and the service rate of investors is negatively correlated with profit.Secondly,by using the data of hongling venture capital P2 P lending platform and taking "the borrower overdue" as the measurement standard of the borrower's reputation,the effectiveness of the borrower's reputation mechanism was investigated,and the results showed that the borrower's reputation mechanism was generally invalid.Specifically,the borrower's historical total delinquency rate is taken as a measure of the negative reputation of P2 P online lending,and further divided into historical overdue repayment rate and historical overdue non-repayment rate.Empirical research is conducted on the impact of different negative reputation on borrowers.The results show that: first,the reputation mechanism is generally invalid in the total samples.In terms of the success rate of borrowing,the historical total delinquency rate does not affect the success rate of borrowing;Historical delinquency rates help increase the success rate of borrowers;Historical delinquencies tend to reduce the success rate of borrowers.In terms of borrowing interest rate,the higher the historical default rate,the higher the borrowing interest rate;The higher the historical delinquency rate,the higher the interest rate of the borrower;The higher the historical delinquency rate,the lower the interest rate.In terms of the time of completion,the historical total overdue rate,historical overdue repayment rate and historical overdue non-repayment rate have no effect.Second,when the total sample is divided into two sub-samples of sky bid and month bid according to the borrowing time,reputation mechanism is effective in sky bid and invalid in month bid.In the sky standard,the worse the reputation of the borrower,the lower the success rate of borrowing,the higher the interest rate,no impact on the borrowing time.In the monthly bid,the more disreputable the borrower,the higher the success rate,regardless of the interest rate.In terms of the success rate of loan,the historical overdue repayment rate increases the success rate of borrowers,while the historical overdue rate has nothing to do with the success rate of borrowers.In terms of borrowing interest rate,the historical overdue repayment rate does not affect the borrowing interest rate.The higher the historical overdue repayment rate is,the lower the borrowing interest rate is.Third,considering the two-sided platform attributes of P2 P network lending,the number of borrowers and investors on a daily basis is taken as control variables to introduce into the empirical model,and the results confirm the existence of cross network externalities and self-network externalities.Thirdly,the data of hongling venture capital P2 P lending platform is also adopted to examine the effectiveness of the borrower's reputation mechanism by taking "false statement" as the measurement standard of the borrower's reputation.The results show that the borrower's reputation mechanism is generally effective.Specifically,the borrower's reputation is defined as the negative reputation of the borrower in the "false statement",and the influence of such negative reputation on the borrower's behavior under the nature of bilateral market is studied.The research results show that: first,"false statement" reduces the success rate of borrower's loan,lengthens the time of borrower's full bid,but also reduces the interest rate.Second,from the perspective of bilateral market,there are positive cross-network externalities between borrowers and investors,and the significance and symbols of self-network externalities are not the same.Third,despite negative reputation,there is no superposition effect between "false statement" and the borrower's historical repayment situation.Finally,using data from a P2 P lending industry,network of home loan released "brand integration" reputation as a platform of criteria,to investigate the efficacy of platform reputation mechanism,the results showed that the P2 P platform reputation mechanism in the industry before the explosion ray is invalid,after explosion ray is effective in the industry,the reason may be related to P2 P lending attributes of bilateral market and industry excessive competition.Specifically,"popularity points" reflecting the number of borrowers and "transaction points" reflecting the volume of transactions are taken as explained variables,and combined with the natural event of P2 P online lending explosion in June 2018,to observe whether the change of external environment will affect the effect of reputation mechanism.The research results show that: first,reputation increases transaction volume,but does not affect the number of borrowers,that is,reputation is significantly positive for "trading points",but not significant for "popularity points".Secondly,the total samples are divided into two parts: the P2 P industry before and after the lightning explosion.The reputation mechanism before the lightning explosion is invalid,and the reputation mechanism after the lightning explosion is effective.Third,in view of the lack of data disclosure,the monthly average interest rate of P2 P platforms can be obtained as a control variable.It is found that reputation increases the transaction volume,but does not affect the number of borrowers.In short,the reputation mechanism of P2 P online lending has been greatly weakened,which is an important reason for the frequent explosion of P2 P online lending in China.What causes the failure of reputation mechanism of P2 P network lending in China?This paper believes that there are many reasons,mainly related to the nature of P2 P network lending.Specifically,it includes the credit intermediary property of P2 P online lending,the nature of P2 P two-sided platform,the existence of P2 P scalpers,the lack of perfect credit investigation system,and the over-competitive market environment.Reputation mechanism for the P2 P lending in China and the cause of the weakening and the general principles of reputation mechanism,combined with the nature of the P2 P lending,finally,the paper discusses the policy Suggestions to perfect the mechanism of the reputation of the P2 P lending,including gradually carry out the policies of the nature of P2 P network transformation,improve industry admittance threshold,establishing the credit evaluation system,strengthen information sharing mechanism.