| This dissertation introduces a novel approach to the philosophical conceptions of the self and to the bioethical underpinnings of psychiatry through an investigation of the ontological and ethical implications of psychiatric diagnoses on personal identity.;The dissertation draws on interdisciplinary research that includes developmental psychology, social psychology, cognitive science, psychiatry, and patient memoirs. Its interdisciplinary nature substantiates its main claims. It also shows that philosophical analysis is indispensable in research on the ethics of mental health.;The first two chapters provide a descriptive account of how the narrative framings of life experiences shape a subject's self-knowledge and define the range and number of social, emotional, and personal relations that connect her to others, to the social world, and to her own humanity. The last two chapters apply this descriptive framework to the practical problems psychiatric patients are faced with while receiving psychiatric treatment. Through an analysis of memoirs written by psychiatric patients who received a psychiatric diagnosis based on the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and an investigation of the criticisms that challenge contemporary psychiatry, it is suggested that there are grounds to believe that sometimes DSM-based narratives constrain the diagnosed subject's flourishing, reduce subjects' sense of agency, and restrict their autonomy. However, there are also grounds for believing that sometimes DSM-based narratives contribute to flourishing. This conclusion draws attention to the problems in the theory and practice of psychiatry and highlights the need to focus on diagnosed subjects' experiences with their mental disorder and psychiatric treatment. |
