| Kant's response to Hume in the Critique of Pure Reason is generally considered to be narrow in scope, fundamentally critical, and focused solely on Hume's account of causation. In this dissertation, I argue that this view is, at best, a very narrow one and, at worst, a serious distortion of the differences between Kant's and Hume's philosophical views and of Hume's influence on the development of the Critique. On my view, Kant's response is not only more sympathetic than is traditionally supposed but also critical of Hume in ways that have been overlooked. Once these aspects are identified, it becomes clear that, far from being limited to his account of causation, Kant's response to Hume involves arguments in every major section of the Critique. More specifically, Hume exerted a positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic and, more generally, on Kant's conception of a 'critique of pure reason'. But Kant was also critical of Hume's diagnosis of and remedy for our natural desire to acquire knowledge of supersensible objects and of aspects of Hume's critique of theism in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Although the account of Kant's response to Hume that emerges is more nuanced than others, its central theme is quite simple. The continuities between Kant and Hume are far greater than is generally believed and, indeed, almost as important as the differences. |
