On the Parfitian psychological approach to personal identity

On the Parfitian Psychological Approach to Personal Identity by Huiyuhl Yi It is common sense that we are persistent beings, but what is the nature of our persistence? By virtue of what do we persist over time? Questions of this sort constitute the core of philosophical inquiry into personal identity. The most influential answer to these questions is the psychological approach to personal identity, which holds that you and I persist over time by virtue of maintaining certain psychological features. In this dissertation, I discuss a particular version of the psychological approach based on Derek Parfit's view of personal identity. The Parfitian view is distinctive for making the following two claims: (i) personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, and (ii) personal identity does not matter for survival.;For those who agree with the first claim, it is pressing to define what it means for the appropriate psychological continuity relation to take or not take a branching form. This task---defining "the non-branching clause"---has been curiously neglected in the literature on personal identity. In this dissertation, I introduce three possible analyses of the non-branching clause. Subsequently, I show that each analysis faces serious problems. Since these three exhaust the viable options for Parfitian theorists to analyze the non-branching clause, I conclude that the Parfitian psychological view is doomed to failure in this analysis.;Afterwards, I turn to another claim of the Parfitian view concerning the divergence between one's identity and what matters in one's survival. I proffer what the proponents of the Parfitian view ought to present as the psychological relation that best represents what matters. Then I specify the appropriate causal constraint embedded in the notion of psychological connectedness, which constitutes a building block of the psychological relation representing what matters. Psychological Sequentialism holds that no such constraint is necessary. I argue that sequentialism fails.;Finally, I discuss Animalism, one of the most prominent rivals of the psychological approach in current literature. The primary argument in support of Animalism is known as the thinking-animal argument. I examine two attempts to refute the argument, arguing that they are not successful.