Discovering existence with Emmanuel Levinas, 1929--1951

Discovering Existence with Emmanuel Levinas, 1929-1951 is a study of the origins and unity of Levinas's early philosophy, which provides a sustained examination of the meaning of the term 'existence' in this period of Levinas's thought. In chapter one, "A Sketch of Levinas's Philosophical Itinerary from 1929 to 1951," I present an analysis of the development of Levinas's philosophy, which focuses on the emergence of and connection between its fundamental themes, which I then discuss in greater detail in subsequent chapters. In chapter two, "Early Reflections on the Phenomenological Movement," I examine Levinas's early interpretation of the structure of the phenomenological movement and offer an interpretation of The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology (1930), which clarifies his argument about the unity of the phenomenological movement from Husserl's Logical Investigations to Heidegger's Being and Time and which also takes account of several of Levinas's other writings on the phenomenological movement. In chapter three, "The Constitution of the Ego and the Meaning of Being in General," I explore the origin and development of the basic themes of Levinas's early phenomenological analyses. I argue that one major implication of Levinas's analysis and critique of phenomenology in the Theory of Intuition is that the admission of sensation into the foundation of consciousness is a necessary condition for an analysis of the constitution of the ego and that the horrors of war provide the concrete mode of access through which Levinas answers the question concerning the meaning of being in general. In my conclusion, I take "Is Ontology Fundamental?" (1951) as my point of departure in order to approach questions concerning the primacy and significance of the intersubjective relation in Levinas's early writings. I argue that the ethical significance of the intersubjective relation in Levinas's 1951 analysis has its foundation in his prior concern for the horrors of war and that the primacy of this relation has its basis in his earliest interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, wherein he contends that the intersubjective reduction is more fundamental than the egological reduction.