| The three papers, which comprise this dissertation, revisit the interconnected issues of civil war, natural resources, and politics. Specifically, the first paper attempts to understand how natural resource abundance causes civil war. To this end, I test the impact of a variety of measures of resource abundance and political variables. I find that when political variables are added to the seminal Collier and Hoeffler civil war model, the impact of natural resource exports disappears, indicating that resource wealth may encourage civil war by undermining government stability.;The second paper argues that researchers should rethink the category of civil war. Specifically, this paper finds that civil wars for control of government occur in resource-rich countries, and that lootable resources, such as drugs, may be an important cause of these wars. Furthermore, wars for control of government occur where there is political instability and economic stagnation. None of the above factors, however, cause separatist wars. Rather, ethnic grievances, which have been downplayed in the literature on civil war, are a significant cause of separatist wars. Further tests indicate that when political institutions exacerbate ethnic tensions, separatist wars are more likely.;High recidivism rates of civil war, and the apparent connection between political institutions and civil war, motivate the final paper's theme of post-war political recovery. I find that wars that end in stalemates, long wars, and wars that end because of UN intervention all improve post-war democracy, and may even help a country achieve a higher level of democracy than it otherwise would have. Although resource abundance hurts democracy across countries, within a country, increases in resource abundance may improve democracy. When it comes to less glamorous institutions---property rights and checks and balances---civil war is far less helpful. Checks and balances improve during wars, but are consolidated at war's end. Property rights also suffer during war and do not recover quickly. This paper indicates that democracy and lasting peace are most feasible where settlements promote power sharing, and that peace-makers too often ignore institutions which promote long term stability, growth, and peace. |
