Democracy challenged: Limitations on extremist participation in the electoral arena

This dissertation examines the limitations that democracies impose upon extremist participation in the electoral arena. It seeks to offer an updated account of these limitations, to examine the normative implications of this account, and to offer a practical framework for the application of these limitations to extremist parties and candidates. These issues are dealt with in three related articles.;The first article, The Banning of Political Parties: From the Weimar paradigm to the Legitimacy Paradigm, seeks to identify the purpose a party-ban is meant to achieve. It challenges the prevalent paradigm underlying the party-banning discussion which focuses upon the "Weimar scenario" and suggests an alternative paradigm which focuses upon the electoral arena as a source of legitimacy and status and not as merely an instrument for coming to power. The article links this new paradigm to the change in the nature of political parties and their transformation from primarily representative organizations into public utility, or "public service agencies". Once the contours of the legitimacy paradigm are established, the article proceeds to examine which types of parties can justifiably be banned within the paradigm and to address some of its practical implications.;The second article, Shooting and Talking: When Can Democracies Ban Parties for Support of Violence, focuses upon parties that express support for violence. It develops a framework for examining which types of support for violence could justify a party ban and proceeds to apply this framework to three recent banning decisions in Spain (Batasuna), Israel (Balad) and the European Court of Human Rights ( Refah). Finally, the article considers the pragmatic considerations involved in a banning decision, both the dangers inherent in such a decision and the practical and institutional means by which these dangers can be mitigated.;The third article, Extremism in the Electoral Arena: Challenging the Myth of American Exceptionalism, is devoted to the American electoral system, showing that, contrary to common assumptions, the American electoral arena is actually quite restrictive towards extremists. The article argues that through the combination of structural, seemingly neutral limitations, and the exclusion rights granted to major parties, extremists are effectively excluded from the American electoral arena. The article explains that some of these elements have been created intentionally to impede extremist political parties. The article proceeds to compare the American approach to extremism in the electoral arena with the direct banning approach discussed in the first two articles, and reflects upon the lessons that can be drawn for relevant issues in American electoral law.