| I take a new approach to the classic problem of political obligation: I argue that political obligation is best understood as an instance of a kind of obligation that grows out of basic features of interpersonal relationships, associative obligation.;I begin by developing a theory of the obligations we have to our associates by starting with what is ethically significant about sustained interpersonal relationships, such as those we have with our friends and family. I argue that when we interact with others, we affect each other's mental states, making us psychologically connected. Psychological connectedness is, in turn, the grounds for associative obligation. I further develop this account to consider what the content and weight of these obligations consists in.;In the second half of the dissertation, I extend this general theory to an account of political obligation, arguing that political obligations are a kind of associative obligation, based on relationships that are distinctively political in that they develop through participation in conversations about the political society's policies and principles. All these conversations together comprise the "national conversation." This account gets us much of the classical concept of political obligation, but has some novel implications, particularly in scope: since obligation is tied to participation, some citizens will be more obligated than others, and some might be excluded, while some non-citizens will be included.;This raises interesting issues for related questions in political philosophy. Whether participants' political obligations include a general obligation to obey the law, and what this means, depends in part on whether they have obligations to the institutions as well as the individuals. Political obligation as associative also influences the way we think of obligations to co-nationals as compared to what is morally required of us to do for non-nationals. |
