| This collection of papers introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting common policies and common supranational institutions, in order to study various aspects of the variable geometry and the dynamics of international union formation with a focus on European integration. I make use of non-cooperative bargaining games of coalition formation by way of modeling the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. For example, why should we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand union of countries even if the latter is assumed to be weakly effcient? Chapter 1 presents a dynamic model of union creation and expansion under the assumption of a 'credibility lag' about the effectiveness and desirability of partial coalition formation, while chapter 2 proposes asymmetric information about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that generates gradual union formation in equilibrium. Chapter 3 utilizes a coalition-theoretic approach to extend this framework to an N-country setting and, accordingly, to tease out the equilibrium relationship between union size and scope. Related cases from the European Union are discussed throughout for the purpose of providing interesting illustrations of the proposed theories. |
