Competition without democracy: Elections and distributive politics in Mubarak's Egypt

Despite its authoritarian political structure, Egypt's government has held competitive parliamentary elections for more than thirty years. This project seeks to unravel a series of interrelated puzzles about elections in Egypt: In what ways does the authoritarian regime benefit from holding competitive sub-national elections? Why do candidates spend scarce resources to run for a seat in a parliament that does not make policy? Why do citizens engage in the costly act of voting in such a context? And do we observe patterns of economic change surrounding autocratic elections that resemble the trends observed in democracies? The answers to these questions are critical for understanding the mechanics of authoritarian survival, both in Egypt and elsewhere. I argue that the authoritarian regime in Egypt has endured not in spite of competitive elections, but, to some degree, because of these elections. In particular, competitive parliamentary elections in Egypt are incentive compatible for a series of important political actors and ease important forms of distributional conflict, particularly conflict over access to spoils.