| Judicial independence is critical to enforcement of separation of powers, effective protection of property rights, and the rule of law. It is also considered to be a primary means for political leaders to tie their own hands and to enhance the credibility of their policy commitments. Nearly every national constitution currently in force offers at least rhetorical support of this norm. But despite the widespread normative support for judicial independence many court systems are characterized by arbitrary removal of judges, political pressures on justices during the adjudication process, and other forms of manipulation by executives or legislatures.; This dissertation analyzes the linkages between social cleavages, state allocation of rents, political instability and levels of judicial independence. States characterized by factional political competition between non-overlapping groups were more likely to have low levels of judicial independence as a result of greater reliance upon allocation of private or semi-private goods to supporters and higher levels of political instability. Statistical tests using three data sets of 100+ countries supported these hypotheses; in addition, two case studies of judicial politics in Malaysia and the Philippines provided additional support. Judicial independence in both countries has been contingent upon the size and stability of regime support; in cases where judicial independence reduced political leaders' ability to transfer resources to critical allies the courts were political neutralized through removal of justices, changes to the courts' jurisdiction, or constitutional amendment. This dissertation not only addressed the importance of social structure and a regime's policy profile in shaping political leaders' incentives to provide independent judiciaries but also shows how judicial independence may serve as a political liability rather than a source of credibility in the context of political factionalism and zero-sum competition for state rents. |
