| Antagonism in the Liberal Tradition develops a theory of liberal antagonism that informs both our historical understanding of the shape of liberal theory and our thinking about contemporary liberal democratic problems. In it, I respond to various arguments that accuse liberalism of lacking "backbone." For example, liberalism is viewed as incapable of making tough decisions, postponing decisive actions by endless conversation (Schmitt). Liberals are seen as irresolute and endlessly tolerant to a fault---tolerant even of ways of life inimical to their own principles (Strauss). They would prefer, it is said, to bracket difficult issues rather than deal with the moral and political conflicts they will likely engender (Sandel). Indeed, some of liberalism's defenders regard this very aspect of liberalism---its ability to placate conflict---to be one of its strongest suits (Holmes, Rawls).;But what if liberalism is not as wary of conflict as its critics and defenders have alleged? What if there is, buried deep within the liberal tradition, a sensibility that welcomes and even encourages conflict? What would this tradition of "antagonistic liberalism" look like? What would be its implications for contemporary liberalism? In readings of classical liberals like Mill and Tocqueville, alongside chapters on less familiar thinkers like Algernon Sidney and Adam Ferguson, I explain how commitments derived from liberal thought can engender strong, if potentially disquieting, commitments to antagonism. I argue that, in developing notions of freedom, autonomy, or flourishing, many liberal theorists have sought to remove particularly destructive antagonisms (such as violent factionalism) even as they reaffirm the salutary role of other creative and life-sustaining antagonisms (such as moral and political disagreement, commercial competition, or civil tumult). A final chapter examining Nietzsche and the romantic turn in liberal theory questions whether even those liberal commitments held to be morally neutral---democratic reciprocity, for example---can exist alongside a categorical forswearing of antagonism, suffering, and even violence. |
